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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT 
The caption of this case contains a list of all parties to the proceedings in 
the district court. This appeal, however, involves only the Leola J. Ericksen Family 
Limited Partnership and J. Alton Veibell. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Leola J. Ericksen Family Limited Partnership (the "Partnership" or the 
"Ericksens") agrees that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the district court correctly reform the deed in this case because 
of a mutual mistake that occurred in the drafting of the property description? 
This was a primary subject of the bench trial, and is the only issue Veibell is 
appealing. R. 699 and 700. The Partnership believes the district court ruled correctly. 
Veibell incorrectly states the standard of review. "The standard of appellate 
review in equity cases, even where the level of the proof in the trial court is clear and 
convincing evidence, is that of clear preponderance." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 
105 (Utah 1984). Furthermore, "where the evidence is in conflict this Court will not 
upset the findings in the trial court unless the evidence so clearly preponderates against 
them that this Court is convinced that a manifest injustice has been done." Id. 
2. Did the district court err when it concluded that title to a piece of 
property should be quieted in Veibell's name under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, even though Veibell presented no evidence of mutual acquiescence by 
adjoining landowners in the fence as the boundary line, Veibell admitted he knew a 1938 
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deed defined the boundary between the properties, and for more than 20 years before trial 
Veibell acquiesced in the record boundary as the boundary? 
This issue was preserved below as it was tried at the bench trial. R. 699 
and 700. 
In Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998), this Court indicated that a 
finding of boundary by acquiescence is similar to a finding of an easement and noted that 
"'[t]he finding that an easement exists is a conclusion of law.5" 970 P.2d at 1256 (quoting 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998)). Yet, because the finding is a 
'"highly fact-dependent question,"' this Court grants deference to the district court's 
findings of fact, which this Court will not set aside unless clearly erroneous. Orton, 970 
P.2d at 1256-57 (quoting Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311). Because the ultimate determination 
of whether a given set of facts creates a boundary by acquiescence is a conclusion of law, 
however, the application of the law to the facts on this issue is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("[t]he effect of a given set of facts is a 
question of law.") 
3. Did Veibell waive the right to appeal the trial court's ruling as to the 
West Triangle that was adverse to him by not addressing it in his opening brief? 
This issue was created by Veibell's brief in this Court at pages 28-29, where 
he attempts to reserve the issue for later argument in his reply brief. 
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Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[r]eply 
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief/' This 
Court has also held that "[a]s a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief will 
not be considered on appeal. . . ." Romrell v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 
(Utah 1980). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
There are no controlling provisions of a constitution, statute, ordinance, 
rule, or regulation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the District 
Court 
This is a boundary dispute. Veibell and the Ericksens own contiguous 
pieces of property that straddle the Box Elder County and Cache County line. Prior to 
1967 Veibell owned 208.5 acres situated south of the Ericksens' property. In 1967, 
Veibell sold about 75 acres on the western side of his property to the Ericksens. 
In the district court, Veibell claimed that he owned two triangular pieces of 
property along the north end of his property as it existed before the 1967 sale to the 
Ericksens, one because he claimed he was the record owner of it (Triangle A on 
Plaintiffs Ex. 1, the "West Triangle"), and the other by the doctrine of boundary by 
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acquiescence (Triangle B on Plaintiffs Ex. 1, the "East Triangle").1 The Partnership 
counterclaimed that the West Triangle belonged to it, and that the eastern boundary of the 
parcel that was purchased in 1967 was further east than Veibell believed, because the 
deed needed to be reformed to reflect the intentions of the parties. The Partnership also 
disputed VeibelPs claim to the East Triangle. 
A bench trial was held on October 12 and 13, 2000. At the conclusion of 
the bench trial, the district court ruled that title to the West Triangle should be quieted to 
the Partnership, and that title to the East Triangle should be quieted to Veibell. The 
district court also ruled that the 1967 deed should be reformed to more accurately reflect 
the intentions of the parties to the transaction. R. 700 at 75-77. A judgment quieting title 
as directed by the district court was signed on June 1, 2001. R. 652-55; Addendum 
("Add.") at 43-46. Veibell filed a notice of appeal on June 7, 2001, R. 679-80, and an 
amended notice of appeal on July 5, 2001, R. 690-91. The Partnership filed a notice of 
cross appeal on July 3, 2001. R. 692-94. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Veibell argues only that the district court's 
decision on the reformation claim should be reversed. He did not challenge the ruling 
1
 These triangles can also be seen on Defendant's Exhibit 10, which is found in the 
Addendum at 11. The triangle on the left is the West Triangle, and the triangle on the 
right is the East Triangle. 
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quieting title to the West Triangle in the Partnership, but tried to reserve that for later 
argument in his reply brief. Appellant's Brief at 28-29.2 
II. Statement of Facts. 
A. The Partnership's Reformation Claim, 
Prior to 1967, Veibell owned a rectangular tract of land containing about 
208.5 acres. Def. Exs. 1, 2; Add. at 1,2. In 1967, Veibell agreed to sell part of the land 
to Durrell and Leola J. Ericksen. The Real Estate Contract, warranty deed, and survey 
certificate each referenced a parcel of property "containing in all 75.8 acres, more or 
less." Def. Exs. 12 and 13; Add. at 13-18. The warranty deed contained a southern 
boundary measurement of 927.7 feet, while the Real Estate Contract and survey 
certificate contained a southern boundary measurement of 972.7 feet. Def. Exs. 12 
and 13; Add. at 13-18. Another document, a blueprint found with the Abstract of Title 
Veibell had had prepared for the transaction also showed a southern boundary of 972.7 
feet. Def. Exs. 15, 21; Add. at 20, 25; see R. 699 at 111-12. 
The main problem with the property description contained in the warranty 
deed, Real Estate Contract, and survey certificate, however, is that it does not close and it 
2Some of VeibelPs appendices have been altered from the form in which they were 
presented to the district court. Appendix B is Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, but most of the exhibit 
has been redacted and commentary has been added that is inconsistent with the district 
court's findings. Appendix C is Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, but some critical information has 
been redacted. Appendix F may be a combination of Defendant's Exhibit 18 and 
Defendant's Exhibit 20, with some commentary added. The Court should rely upon the 
exhibits presented to the district court and not as altered by Veibell. 
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overlaps about ten acres onto property to the west of what Veibell owned in 1967. 
PL Ex. 6 (Add. at 29); R. 700 at 14; R. 699 at 117-20; Def. Exs. 17, 18, 19, 20 (Add. 
at 22-24).3 For the description to fit within what Veibell owned before the transfer, the 
entire parcel described would have to be shifted east more than 100 feet. Whether the 
length of the southern boundary is 927.7 feet as stated in the warranty deed, or 972.7 feet 
as stated in the Real Estate Contract and survey certificate, compare Def. Ex. 12 with 
Def. Ex. 13, Def. Ex. 12 at 3, and Def. Ex. 15 (Add. at 13, 15, 16, 20), there is only about 
816 feet remaining along the southern border of the parcel if the eastern boundary is 
established where Veibell claims it should be. PL Ex. 6 (Add. at 29); R. 700 at 14. Also, 
if the eastern boundary is where Veibell claims it is, that would have resulted in the 
transfer of only about 64 acres, rather than "75.8 acres, more or less" as provided in each 
of the property descriptions. Def. Ex. 20 (Add. at 24); R. 699 at 120; PL Ex. 6; Add. 
at 29. 
The Partnership presented evidence that the parties intended the transfer of 
about 75 acres of land. The warranty deed, Real Estate Contract, and survey certificate 
each reference 75.8 acres, more or less. The purchase price for the property was 
$13,125.00. Def. Ex. 13; Add. at 16-18. Veibell testified the price was set at $175 per 
acre, and that the total price was obtained by multiplying $175 by 75 acres. R. 699 
3Those pages of the Addendum found at 22 through 24 are overlays of Defendant's 
Exhibit 18 on Defendant's Exhibit 17 (p. 22), Defendants's Exhibit 19 on Defendant's 
Exhibit 17 (p. 23), and Defendant's Exhibit 20 on Defendant's Exhibit 17 (p. 24). 
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at 65-66. Veibell also understood until this litigation was commenced that the transaction 
was for 75 acres. R. 699 at 65, 67; see also Def. Ex. 14 where Veibell told some third 
party that he had sold 75 acres to the Ericksens. Add. at 19. The Ericksens' son, Leo, 
who testified at trial, said he worked the farm until he left on an LDS mission in May, 
1967, and that he understood clearly that his parents purchased 75 acres from Veibell. 
R. 699 at 95. The Ericksens have also paid taxes to Box Elder County since 1967 on 75.8 
acres of land. R. 699 at 113-14; Def. Ex. 16; Add. at 21. 
Veibell explained to the district court that he had placed stakes along what 
he wanted to be the eastern boundary of the parcel he was selling to the Ericksens, and 
that he simply intended to sell the Ericksens whatever was west of that line—a theory he 
maintained throughout trial and that he now presses on appeal. See, e.g., R. 699 at 65. 
He said that Mr. Ericksen hired the surveyor to provide a property description for the 
parcel and that the surveyor was supposed to follow the stakes. R. 699 at 23. But, 
Veibell admitted he never met the surveyor, and that he was not present when the survey 
was done. R. 699 at 60. He admitted he really had no idea what the survey was of. Id. 
There was also no evidence, other than Veibell's word, that any stakes were put anywhere 
along what he intended to be the eastern boundary of the parcel sold to the Ericksens in 
1967. 
Paul Palmer testified that he constructed a fence sometime in the late 1960s 
or early 1970s along the eastern side of the Ericksen parcel. R. 699 at 86. He said at the 
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south end, at Mr. Ericksen's insistence, he began the fence 50 to 150 feet east and down 
hill from where he saw a stake, but he also testified he did not know where the record 
boundary was supposed to be. R. 699 at 87, 92. He just placed the fence where Veibell 
and Mr. Ericksen told him to put it after Mr. Ericksen objected to where he initially tried 
to start it. R. 699 at 86, 88, 89. Importantly, there was no evidence the stake Palmer said 
he saw was one of the stakes Veibell claims to have placed in 1967. 
Leo Ericksen testified that when he worked the farm with his father until he 
left on his mission in May, 1967, he never saw any stakes along the eastern border of the 
parcel the Ericksens purchased from Veibell. R. 699 at 96. The transfer of the property 
occurred on or about April 10, 1967. Def. Ex. 12; Add. at 13. Leo Ericksen also testified 
that after he returned from his mission he worked on the farm until 1972 and did not see 
any stakes along the eastern boundary. R. 699 at 97. Leo Ericksen first saw stakes along 
the eastern border in the early 1980s, id., which was about the time Veibell testified he 
began trying to develop his remaining property. R. 699 at 11-15. 
David Nelson, a son-in-law of Durrell Ericksen, testified that he worked 
with Mr. Ericksen on the farm in 1967, beginning in early June, and that one of his jobs 
that summer was to help fix the fence that ran along the creek dividing Veibell5s land 
from the parcel he had just transferred to the Ericksens. R. 699 at 104. Mr. Nelson also 
testified that he walked the fence line each year after that until about 1993 to check and 
fix the fence to prevent horses from getting out. R. 699 at 105-06. Mr. Nelson testified 
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that he saw no stakes along that eastern boundary in 1967 or any year after that until the 
early 1980s, when the first stakes appeared. Id. Again, as mentioned above, the early 
1980s was about the same time Veibell started trying to develop his remaining property. 
R. 699 at 11-15. 
Charlotte Nelson, a daughter of Durrell Ericksen, testified that she worked 
the farm since about 1969, and that she also did not see stakes along the eastern boundary 
with Veibell in the 1960s or 1970s. R. 699 at 108. Consistent with other witnesses, she 
testified that the first stakes appeared in the early 1980s. R. 699 at 109. Importantly to 
the district court, Mrs. Nelson also testified that if the boundary were where Veibell 
claimed it was, that would effectively cut off access by the Ericksens over their own 
property to the southeast corner of the parcel because of a large, deep gully on the south 
end. R. 699 at 129. If the boundary is where Veibell claims, the Ericksens could only 
access that corner of the parcel over VeibelPs property. Id. However, if the southern 
boundary of the parcel were either 927.7 feet or 972.7 feet, the Ericksens could access the 
southeast corner of their property. Id. 
Mrs. Nelson also testified that the Ericksens had paid taxes on 75.8 acres 
since 1967, and she identified the Partnership's tax notice from 1999 showing an 
assessment by Box Elder County for 75.8 acres. R. 699 at 113-14; Def. Ex. 16; Add. 
at 21. A technician for the Box Elder County recorder's office, Joel Henry, confirmed 
that the Ericksens and the Partnership had paid taxes on 75.8 acres. R. 700 at 40-41. 
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A surveyor, Jeff Hansen, testified that he retraced the Moser survey for 
Veibell. He also said he found a Moser survey pin at one point along the eastern side of 
the Ericksen parcel, but that he found no other indications of where Moser went from 
there or what he intended. R. 700 at 18. He tried rotating the eastern boundary leg so that 
the southern boundary was as long as the distance indicated in the Moser survey and 
warranty deed (972.7 feet and 927.7 feet), and when he did that he testified the Ericksen 
i 
parcel would have been about 76.5 acres. R. 700 at 25-26. See also PL Ex. 6; Add. at 29. 
Critically, Charlotte Nelson testified that if the eastern leg of the Moser survey were 
rotated as Mr. Hansen suggested, that would provide the Ericksens access to the southeast 
corner of their property without having to trespass over Veibell's property. R. 700 at 45. 
The Ericksens presented overlay exhibits to the district court showing, over 
an aerial photograph of the property, where the boundary would be using 972.7 feet, 
927.7 feet, or 816 feet as the southern boundary of the Ericksen parcel. Def. Exs. 17 
(photo), 18 (927.7 feet), 19 (972.7 feet), 20 (816 feet); Add. at 22-24. These exhibits 
were received without objection. R. 699 at 121. 
After hearing the evidence, the district court ruled in open court as follows 
on the reformation claim: 
With regards to the deed reformation claim, the court will 
reform the deed to conform with the description as shown in 
defendant's exhibit number 18. This results in a parcel of 
land of approximately 73 acres. The parties intended 75 acres 
more or less. The court finds that this reformation of the deed 
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is appropriate. That the evidence on this issue is clear and 
convincing. 
I'll enumerate some of those factors, though not all of 
them at this time. This deed description will come closer to 
the existing fence. This deed description allows access to that 
southeast triangle of the Ericksen property which would 
otherwise be inaccessible. The sales price was clearly based 
upon a specific number of acres, 75. The 73 acres is more 
close to 75; 64 is less. Mr. Veibell was paid for 75 acres. 
Since the date of the transaction the Ericksens have paid taxes 
on 75 acres. Mr. Veibell, on the other hand, has not paid 
taxes on the area in dispute because of the way the county 
treats the property in deducting the transfers from the original 
parcel. 
R. 700 at 75-76; Add. at 47-48. 
The district court later entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
the reformation claim, concluding that the parties intended a transfer of about 75 acres, 
and that the 1967 deed should be reformed to be consistent with Defendant's Exhibit 18. 
R. 641-45; Add. at 32-36. 
The district court entered a Final Judgment and Order reforming the deed 
and quieting title to the Partnership in a parcel of property that matched Defendant's 
Exhibit 18. R. 652-55; Add. at 43-46. 
!$• VeibelFs Boundary By Acquiescence Claim. 
Unlike its findings of fact on the reformation claim, the district court's 
findings of fact concerning Veibell's boundary by acquiescence claim to the East Triangle 
are not supported by the evidence. These findings are reproduced below, along with all 
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evidence marshaled that supports each, and indications where there was no evidence 
presented to support the finding. The evidence presented by Veibell, as will be seen, was 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a finding of boundary by acquiescence. The 
Partnership will also set forth the additional evidence it presented that was ignored by the 
district court in its Findings of Fact. 
[Finding of Fact] 1. On or about 1958, Alton Veibell 
obtained legal title to 208.5 acres based on the following 
property description: 
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the 
Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 West 
of the Sale Lake Meridian, running thence 
South 208.5 rods; thence East 160 rods; thence 
North 208.5 rods; thence West 160 rods to the 
place of beginning, containing 208.5 acres. 
R. 649; Add. at 40. This finding is supported by Defendant's Exhibit 1 (Add. at 1) and 
was not disputed. 
[Finding of Fact] 2. The north boundary of this parcel 
separated Veibell's property from property owned by the 
Ericksens. Both Veibell and the Ericksens believed that a 
fence that separated their properties ran along the north 
boundary. The fence, however, did not follow the record 
boundary line. 
R. 649; Add. at 40. The first sentence of this finding is supported by Defendant's 
Exhibits 1,21, and 22, Add. at 1, 26, 28. There was no dispute at trial as to this issue. 
The second sentence is not supported by the record. Only evidence of 
Veibell's belief was presented at trial. Veibell testified that he believed that the fence that 
12 
separated the properties was the boundary. R. 699 at 11. There was no evidence either 
Durrell Ericksen or his father believed the fence was the boundary. See R. 699 at 9-15. 
Indeed, Veibell acknowledged that a 1938 deed from Durrell Ericksen's father to his 
father established the north boundary of the property, and the deed used a metes and 
bounds description, not the fence. R. 699 at 43-44; Def. Ex. 21; Add. at 26. Thus, there 
could not have been acquiescence in the fence as the boundary by these men. Veibell had 
Bryce Ericksen, Durrell Ericksen's brother, testify that he understood the fence was the 
boundary, but Bryce Ericksen did not own an interest in the property. Def. Ex. 22; Add. 
at 27-28. He was only around while Durrell Ericksen owned the land for about four 
years, yet he did not testify to his brother's belief at all. R. 700 at 30-35. Veibell also 
testified that he and his father have farmed to the fence since the 1930s, and Bryce 
Ericksen testified that the Ericksens farmed to the fence on their side from at least 1935 to 
about 1963. R. 699 at 9-11; R. 700 at 30, 32. 
The third sentence of this finding, that the fence did not follow the record 
boundary line, was not disputed at trial. 
[Finding of Fact] 3. That fence has been in existence 
since at least 1920. 
R. 649; Add. at 40. Although there was no testimony from anyone at trial who was 
around in 1920, there was no serious dispute concerning this issue. 
[Finding of Fact] 4. The Ericksens have farmed up to 
the fence line for decades. 
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R. 649; Add. at 40. The only evidence presented on this issue was the testimony of Bryce 
Ericksen that his father and brother had farmed up to the fence from about 1935 to 1963. 
R. 700 at 30? 32. 
[Finding of Fact] 5. Either Alton Veibell or his father 
have farmed up to the fence, east of Willow Creek, every year 
from approximately 1939 to the present. 
R. 649; Add. at 40. This was supported by Veibell's testimony. R. 699 at 9-11. There 
was no real dispute about this issue at trial. 
[Finding of Fact] 6. From at least 1920 until his death 
in 1951, Alton Veibell's father acknowledged the fence as the 
boundary line. 
R. 649; Add. at 40. There was no evidence presented on this issue. Veibell did not testify 
about what his father acknowledged about the fence as the boundary. He only testified 
about his own understanding of the fence as the boundary line. R. 699 at 9-11, 15. 
VeibelPs father received a deed from Durrell Ericksen's father in 1938 establishing the 
metes and bounds description as the north boundary. R. 699 at 43-44; Def. Ex. 21; Add. 
at 26. That deed made no reference to the fence, so it could not be that Veibell's father 
acknowledged the fence as the boundary. Veibell did testify that his father farmed up to 
the fence line until his father's death in 1951, but there was no evidence that his father 
acknowledged the fence to be the boundary. R. 699 at 9-15. 
[Finding of Fact] 7. From the early 1930fs until the 
present Alton Veibell has acknowledged the fence as the 
boundary line. 
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R. 649; Add. at 40. Veibell was not even born until 1933, and his earliest recollections 
were from the late 1930s. R. 699 at 9. He did testify that from his earliest memory of 
working on the farm, he considered the fence to be the boundary. R. 699 at 9-11, 15. 
But, he did not acquire title to the farm until 1958. Def. Ex. 1; Add. at 1. And, he 
admitted that he learned at least by 1981 that the fence was not the true boundary. R. 699 
at 11. 
[Finding of Fact] 8. Bryce Ericksen, J. Durrell 
Ericksen's brother, who grew up in the area, also testified that 
he had always understood the fence to be the boundary line 
between the Ericksen property and the Veibell property. 
R. 650; Add. at 41. This is accurate as far as the time Bryce Ericksen lived in the area, 
which was about 1935 to 1963. R. 700 at 30-35. The important point, however, is that 
Bryce Ericksen never owned an interest in the property, Def. Ex. 22; Add. at 28, and he 
did not testify about what either his father or his brother—both of whom owned the 
property—understood about the boundary. R. 700 at 30-35. 
[Finding of Fact] 9. The Court finds that under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence title to the eastern 
triangle should be quieted in the name of Alton Veibell. The 
Veibells and Ericksens treated the fence line as the boundary 
between their properties for decades; indeed, because the 
Partnership claims that the same fence line should be 
recognized as the boundary between its property and the 
Veibell property with respect to the western triangle, the 
Partnership is estopped from claiming that it also owns the 
eastern triangle. Alton Veibell and his father before him have 
farmed or otherwise occupied the eastern triangle for more 
then twenty years, in fact for decades. 
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R. 650; Add. at 41. Most of the facts stated in this paragraph are restated from above. 
The one finding that is different is that the Partnership claims that the same fence should 
be recognized as the boundary between its property and the Veibell property with respect 
to the West Triangle. 
The evidence the Partnership presented regarding the West Triangle, 
however, was very different. The Partnership showed that Veibell had never farmed the 
West Triangle. R. 699 at 72. Moreover, the fence at issue for the West Triangle was 
removed by the Ericksens in 1967 following the purchase of the 75.8 acres from Veibell. 
Id, Leo Ericksen helped his father take the fence down, or what was left of it, in 1967. 
R. 699 at 96. The Ericksens have treated the West Triangle as if it was part of the 
property purchased from Veibell, and the Ericksens have grown crops on the parcel and 
run cattle and horses. R. 699 at 110-11. The Ericksens have also paid taxes on 75.8 acres 
since 1967. R. 699 at 113-14; Def. Ex. 16; Add. at 21. The Partnership was careful to 
focus its attention on post-1967 activity regarding the West Triangle when the fence had 
been removed. It is also important to note that Veibell has not appealed the district 
court's ruling regarding the West Triangle. 
Other facts were presented by the Partnership that show there was no 
boundary by acquiescence regarding the East Triangle. Veibell claimed that the first time 
he learned the fence was not the record boundary was in 1981. R. 699 at 11. Actually, as 
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early as 1979, Veibell was on notice that the fence was not the record boundary, and by 
his own admission after 1981 he did not treat the fence as the boundary. 
Veibell sold a lot to his son Craig in 1979 that was precisely in the comer of 
the parcel he acquired by deed in 1958. R. 699 at 36-37; compare Def. Ex. 1 with Def. 
Ex. 3. Add. at 1, 3. See also Def. Exs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12; Add. at 6-8, 11,12, which 
all show the Craig Veibell lot precisely in the comer of the property Veibell obtained in 
1958. He admitted he knew this lot was in the comer of his property, R. 699 at 37, but he 
later claimed he just gave his son a lot on a hill his son wanted. R. 699 at 79. Veibell 
claimed he did not discover until 1981 that the record boundary was not the fence line. 
R. 699 at 11. Thereafter, Veibell had several plat maps drawn for his proposed 
subdivision, all of which used the record boundary as the boundary of his subdivision. 
See Def. Exs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12; Add. at 6-8, 11,12. In 1996, Veibell also tried to 
purchase the property comprising the East Triangle from the Ericksens, but the Ericksens 
refused. See Def. Exs. 4 and 5; Add. at 4, 5. He also deeded the property to a corporation 
under his control and back to himself, each time using the record property line as the 
boundary of the property deeded. Def. Ex. 9, Add. at 9-10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's ruling granting the Partnership reformation of the 1967 
warranty deed should be affirmed. Veibell has not marshaled the evidence supporting the 
district court's decision; indeed, he acts as if there was no evidence to support the district 
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court's decision. Veibell's argument on the reformation claim is also misguided. He 
argues the proper construction of the property description, when such principles do not 
apply where the district court found a mutual mistake based on an error in the drafting of 
the property description. Viewed against the proper standard of review, the evidence 
clearly supports the district court's finding that a mutual mistake occurred and that the 
parties intended a transfer of about 75 acres. 
The district court's findings on Veibell's boundary by acquiescence claim to 
the East Triangle, however, are not supported by the evidence. While Veibell presented 
evidence that he and his father and Durrell Ericksen and his father had farmed to the 
fence line for decades and that he believed the fence was the boundary, Veibell presented 
no evidence that his father, Durrell Ericksen, or Durrell Ericksen's father acquiesced in 
the fence as the boundary. The only Ericksen who Veibell showed believed the fence was 
the boundary was Durrell Ericksen's brother, Bryce, but Bryce never owned an interest in 
the Ericksen property and he left in 1963, just a few years after Durrell Ericksen obtained 
the property. Further, Veibell admitted he knew a 1938 deed from Durrell Ericksen's 
father to his father established the northern boundary of his property, which was the same 
boundary used in the 1958 deed by which Veibell acquired his property. Thus, it is 
doubtful Veibell even acquiesced in the fence as the boundary, and it is clear his father 
and Durrell Ericksen's father did not so acquiesce. Finally, for more than 20 years before 
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trial, Veibell knew the fence was not the boundary and he treated the record boundary as 
the boundary, thereby acquiescing in the record boundary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. VEIBELL HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON THE 
REFORMATION CLAIM AND THE COURT CAN AFFIRM ON 
THIS BASIS ALONE, 
This Court has made it clear that 
To mount a successful attack upon a trial court's findings of 
fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in 
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.. . . 
In some instances, as in this case, an appellant, in attempting 
to meet its marshaling burden, also might assert that the 
record does not contain any evidence in support of a particular 
finding of fact. Under such circumstances, the heavy burden 
of marshaling all of the evidence in support of the finding of 
fact does not shift to the appellee in order to refute the 
appellant's assertion of the absence of evidence. Rather, the 
appellee, when confronted with such a "no evidence" 
sufficiency challenge, need only point to a scintilla of 
credible evidence from the record that supports the finding 
of fact in order to overcome the appellant's "no evidence" 
assertion and to demonstrate thai the appellant has failed to 
meeting its marshaling burden. 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 2002 UT 94 fflf 21-22 
(Utah 2002) (emphasis added; citations omitted). A failure to marshal the evidence 
allows this Court to affirm the district court's findings on that basis alone. Id. f 26. 
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Veibell has failed to even try to marshal evidence that supports the district 
court's decision. He recites primarily his own self-serving testimony, and the evidence he 
presented through his witnesses. Appellant Brief at 4-10, 12-26. He notes some facts 
supporting the district court's decision, but does so almost in passing, and he has ignored 
certain critical facts relied upon by the district court, such as the fact that the boundary 
line as redrawn by the district court would be closer to the existing fence line, R. 700 
at 75, and that the boundary line as redrawn by the district court would allow the 
Partnership access, over its own property, to the southeast corner of the parcel acquired 
from Veibell. R. 699 at 129; R. 700 at 45, 75-76. He also ignores that the Ericksens have 
paid taxes on 75.8 acres since 1967. R. 699 at 113-14; R. 700 at 40-41; Def. Ex. 16; Add. 
at 21. And, he ignores other facts that support the district court's decision. 
Because of Veibell's failure to marshal any evidence supporting the district 
court's decision, and in fact his outright disregard for such evidence, this Court can affirm 
because the district court's decision clearly is supported by well more than a "scintilla of 
credible evidence." Wilson Supply, 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 2002 UT 94 fflf 21-22 (Utah 
2002). Indeed, it supported by the great weight of the evidence. 
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II. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
ON THE REFORMATION ISSUE, 
A. VeibelPs Argument Is Misguided Because This Is a Mutual 
Mistake Case, Not a Case Where the Court Needs to Construe 
the Deed, 
Veibell's brief argues the wrong theory. He argues principles and facts 
concerning proper construction of the deed, when this is a mutual mistake case caused by 
an error in the surveying of the property and drafting of the deed that required reformation 
of the deed itself. Veibell cites Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), for the 
general rules of construction of a deed in Utah, but Hartman is not a "reformation action" 
as Veibell represents it to be. Appellant's Brief at 14. Neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant in Hartman sought reformation or asserted mutual mistake or ambiguity in the 
deed in that case. 596 P.2d at 655. Both parties in Hartman "simply urged the trial 
court . . . to look to the intent of the parties and construe the deed as a matter of law." Id. 
Thus, Hartman has no part in a reformation action claiming mutual mistake caused by an 
error in the drafting of the deed. 
Veibell also cites general principles from a few other cases, and then picks 
and chooses snippets from Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law that he 
believes support his interpretation of the deed.4 Again, however, this is not a case about 
4
 Thomas and Backman, however, make it clear they are only providing an 
"outline summary of the legal rules applicable to land descriptions," and that the "rules 
are very technical and detailed, and riddled with exceptions, so the outline summary is 
necessarily general. . . ." D. Thomas and J. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah 
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interpreting a deed, it is a case about reforming a deed based on mutual mistake. The 
principles Veibell cites do not come into play when mutual mistake in the drafting of the 
deed is claimed. Rather, the intentions of the parties control, even if the deed is 
unambiguous and the normal principles of construction would require a different 
interpretation. For example, in Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984), another 
case Veibell cites, there was no claimed ambiguity in the deed, but the defendant claimed 
mutual mistake and an error by the drafter of the deed in describing the property that was 
intended to be conveyed. The plaintiff sought to quiet title to the property as it was 
described in the deed. 
Despite an unambiguous deed, this Court in Hottinger wrote that 
"[reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate where the terms of 
the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the 
agreement between the parties." 684 P.2d at 1273. The Court affirmed the district 
court's finding of a mutual mistake that "was only due to a mistake by the drafter of the 
deed as to the metes and bounds description that the deed did not conform to the intent of 
the parties." Id. Thus, clearly a metes and bounds description does not prevail over the 
intentions of the parties where the deed itself is in error. This Court then concluded: 
"Reformation is clearly appropriate where there is a variance between the written deed 
and the true agreement of the parties caused by a draftsman." Id. This was true, even 
Real Property Law § 13.05(b)(7) (Lexis 1999). 
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though neither party showed an ambiguity in the deed, only an error in the drafting of the 
description. 
Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 620 (1957), another case cited 
by Veibell, is similar in that no ambiguity existed in the deed, but it was reformed to meet 
the intentions of the parties. This reformation added a 130-foot strip to what was actually 
described in the deed. See also Williams v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1978) 
(rules of construction are not applied when reforming a deed that does not conform to the 
intent of the parties). 
Thus, Veibell's entire approach is misplaced. He argues that intent should 
be gleaned from the deed itself, but the Partnership's entire point has been that the deed 
incorrectly describes the parties' intentions. The district court agreed with the 
Partnership. Based on Hottinger and Naisbitt, the only issue for review is whether the 
district court's decision is supported by the evidence as to what the parties intended and 
whether a mutual mistake occurred in the drafting of the property description. Principles 
in construing the deed as written do not apply here, and it is irrelevant whether another 
surveyor thinks he can retrace what Moser did because the district court found that what 
Moser did was in error. 
23 
B. This Court Must Defer to the District Court's Findings Because 
No Manifest Injustice Has Been Shown By VeibelL 
Now that the proper issue has been framed, it is important to restate the 
standard of appellate review against which this Court must view the evidence. "The 
standard of appellate review in equity cases, even where the level of the proof in the trial 
court is clear and convincing evidence, is that of clear preponderance." Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). This means that "where the 
evidence is in conflict this Court will not upset the findings in the trial court unless the 
evidence so clearly preponderates against them that this Court is convinced that a 
manifest injustice has been done." Id. (Emphasis added.) As alluded to previously, the 
evidence does not clearly preponderate against what the district court found. In fact, the 
evidence clearly supports the district court's decision. 
The evidence of the parties' intent, summarized, is as follows: 
The warranty deed states that the amount of land transferred was "75.8 
acres, more or less." Def. Ex. 12; Add. at 13. 
The Real Estate Contract states that the amount of land transferred was 
"75.8 acres more or less." Def. Ex. 13; Add. at 16. 
The surveyor's certificate describes the property as "75.8 acres, more or 
less." Def. Ex. 12 at 3; Add. at 15. 
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When the southern measurements are used from the warranty deed, Real 
Estate Contract, or surveyor's certificate, that creates a parcel containing somewhere 
between 73 and 76 acres. Def. Ex. 18, 19, 20; Add. at 22-24; R. 700 at 25-26. 
Veibell understood he sold 75 acres to Mr. Ericksen. R. 699 at 65, 67; Def. 
Ex. 14; Add. at 19. 
Veibell received $175 per acre for 75 acres from Mr. Ericksen. R. 699 
at 65-66. 
Veibell represented to others that he sold Mr. Ericksen 75 acres. Def. 
Ex. 14; Add. at 19, and R. 699 at 67. 
Leo Ericksen, who was helping his father with the farm at the time of the 
transaction, understood the transaction was for 75 acres. R. 699 at 95. 
The Ericksens and the Partnership have paid taxes on 75.8 acres since 1967, 
and Veibell has not paid taxes on the 75.8 acres transferred since then. R. 699 at 113-14; 
Def. Ex. 16; Add. at 21, R. 700 at 40-41. 
If the southern boundary is 927.7 feet long, the eastern boundary would be 
closer to the fence line. R. 700 at 75; R. 699 at 119; Def. Exs. 17, 18; Add. at 22. 
If the southern boundary is 927.7 feet long, the Partnership can access the 
southeast corner of the parcel over its own property, rather than over Veibell's property; 
whereas if the eastern boundary is where Veibell claims, the Partnership can only access 
the southeast corner of the parcel by trespassing over Veibell's property. R. 699 at 129; 
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R. 700 at 45; Def. Exs. 17, 18, 19, 20; Add. at 22-24. This point was important to the 
district court. R. 700 at 75-76; Add. at 47-48. 
Veibell claims that in 1967 he staked what he intended to be the eastern 
boundary of the parcel sold to the Ericksens, but he admits he never met the surveyor and 
he was not present when the survey was done. R. 699 at 60. Thus, he does not know if 
the surveyor even followed the stakes he allegedly put in. Id. 
Yet, Leo Ericksen and David Nelson testified that they walked the eastern 
boundary of the property in 1967 and did not see any such stakes. R. 699 at 97 and 104. 
Leo also was present on the farm from 1969 to 1972 and did not see any stakes along the 
eastern boundary then. R. 699 at 97. He did not see stakes along the eastern boundary 
until the early 1980s. Id. David Nelson fixed the fence along the eastern boundary in 
1967 and did not see any stakes, and he walked the entire fence line each year until about 
1993 and did not see stakes along the eastern fence line until the early 1980s. R. 699 
at 104-06. Charlotte Nelson also testified that she did not see stakes along the eastern 
boundary until the 1980s, even though she worked the farm each year from 1969 forward. 
R. 699 at 108-09. The early 1980s was when Veibell began working to try to develop his 
property into a subdivision. R. 699 at 11-15. 
Given the testimony of Leo Ericksen, David Nelson, and Charlotte Nelson, 
the district court had discretion to disbelieve Veibell's self-serving testimony that he put 
stakes in from which to have the survey done. The district court could have believed that 
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Veibell was mistaken and did not put any stakes in until the early 1980's when he began 
to develop his property. The district court also had discretion to disregard Veibell's 
testimony concerning the stakes because Veibell never met the surveyor to tell him to 
survey where he had put stakes, and he did not know what the surveyor surveyed. 
Paul Palmer testified for Veibell that sometime in the late 1960s or early 
1970s he did see a stake near the southern boundary of the parcel, and near the area where 
he was building a fence that was to go along the eastern boundary. R. 699 at 86-92. 
There was also no evidence, however, the stake Palmer said he saw was one of the stakes 
Veibell claims to have placed. But, Palmer also testified that he did not know where the 
parties intended the true boundary to be, and that at Mr. Ericksen's insistence he had to 
begin the fence 50 to 150 feet east and down the hill from the stake he saw. R. 699 at 87, 
92. Given these limitations on Mr. Palmer's testimony, the district court clearly had 
discretion to discount it. 
Indeed, Palmer's testimony provides support for the Partnership's argument 
because the fence was begun—at Durrell Ericksen's insistence—nearer the point the 
Partnership claims the boundary should be. The Partnership argues the southern 
measurement of the parcel Mr. Ericksen bought should be either 927.7 feet or 972.7 feet 
as set forth in the various property descriptions. See Def. Exs. 12, 13, 15; Add. at 13, 15, 
16. Veibell argues it should only be about 820 feet. See PL Ex. 6; Add. at 29. Thus, the 
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place Mr. Palmer began the fence, after Durrell Ericksen objected, is closer to where the 
Partnership claims the true boundary should start. 
Veibell had Jeff Hansen testify, purportedly as an expert, that he tried to 
retrace the Moser survey, and that he found one of the Moser pins that Mr. Hansen 
assumed Moser used in the survey. R. 700 at 8-9. Mr. Hansen's testimony, however, 
suffers from the same problem as Veibell's argument about construing the deed according 
to its language, because it ignores the district court's finding of a mutual mistake in the 
drafting of the deed. No one disputes that the Moser survey draws the eastern boundary 
in the wrong place if the intent of the parties was to convey 75 acres. Mr. Hansen simply 
confirmed that the survey is wrong if the parties intended to convey 75 acres. His 
retracing of the Moser survey came up with only 64.66 acres when he cut off the southern 
boundary at 820 feet, whereas if the southern boundary was extended to 972.7 feet as 
stated in the Moser survey, the parcel would have over 76 acres, much closer to the 75.8 
acres, more or less, stated in the warranty deed. PL Ex. 6 (Add. at 29) and R. 700 at 22, 
24,26. 
Furthermore, Mr. Hansen's testimony assumes that Veibell had actually 
talked with Moser and instructed him to follow the stakes Veibell claimed to have placed 
when performing the survey—i.e., it assumes the district court believed Veibell, but this 
Court can assume the district court did not believe Veibell. R. 700 at 19 and 75-76. Mr. 
Hansen also assumes that the Moser survey is accurate for what Veibell claimed it was 
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supposed to do. These arguments are really an aside when it is recognized that what the 
deed says is beside the point if it conflicts with the intentions of the parties as found by 
the district court. If the intentions of the parties were different than the deed reflected, the 
district court could properly reform the deed, which it did. Hottinger, 684 P.2d at 1273. 
C. VeibeH's Arguments That He Raised for the First Time On 
Appeal are Incorrect. 
Veibell makes certain arguments for the first time on appeal, and thus they 
do not need to be addressed. These are that it was error for the district court to increase 
the number of acres conveyed to match the surveyor's error, that it was wrong to reform 
the deed because Veibell was an innocent party, and that it was wrong to reform the deed 
to include property not included in the property description. Appellant's Brief at 26-28. 
The first and third new arguments are easily dispensed with by reference to 
the Naisbitt and Hottinger cases, which Veibell cites. In Naisbitt, this Court affirmed a 
district court decision that reformed a deed, based on mutual mistake, to add a 130-foot 
strip of land to property described in a deed. 307 P.2d at 624. This 130-foot strip of land 
increased the number of acres and it included property not found in the original property 
description. In Hottinger, this Court affirmed the reformation of a deed that added about 
0.78 acres to the defendant's property described in the deed, which means that the district 
court included property not described in the deed. In both cases, because the parties 
intended the additional property to be included in the transfer, it was proper to reform the 
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deed to include it, even though it meant adding property to what the property description 
included. 
As for his argument that he was innocent in the deal, the district court found 
it to be the intention of both parties, Veibell and the Ericksens, that a transfer of 75 acres 
occur. Even though Mr. Ericksen may have hired the surveyor, the district court found 
that Veibell intended to transfer 75 acres based on all of the other evidence in the record. 
That evidence is supported and Veibell has not shown that the district court should be 
reversed. 
A large amount of evidence supports the district court's conclusion that the 
parties intended to convey a parcel of property containing about 75 acres, and that the 
deed should be reformed to reflect that intent. Veibell's arguments that focus on 
construction of the deed are simply misplaced. Veibell has not shown that the evidence 
so clearly preponderate against the district court's findings so that a manifest injustice 
occurred. Indeed, the evidence supports the district court's conclusion that the deed 
should be reformed, and that decision should be affirmed. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE EAST 
TRIANGLE TO VEIBELL BASED ON BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
The district court should be reversed on one point. Possibly in an effort to 
split the baby, it awarded title to Veibell of the East Triangle based on the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence, even though Veibell knew the true boundary had been 
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established by a 1938 deed between his father and Durrell Ericksen's father, and even 
though Veibell failed to present evidence of mutual acquiescence by adjoining 
landowners in the fence as a boundary for a long period of time. 
A party claiming boundary by acquiescence must establish "(i) occupation 
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence 
in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, [and] (iv) by adjoining 
landowners." Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). Failure to prove any 
one element means a failure of the entire claim. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33 \ 16, 44 
P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 2002). 
A. Veibell Did Show Occupation Up to A Visible Line. 
Veibell did present evidence of occupation up to a visible line marked by 
the fence. Veibell testified that he was born in 1933 and that his first memories of the 
farm were when he was four or five years old. R. 699 at 9-10. His father died in 1951. 
R. 699 at 10. Veibell said his father always fanned up to the fence, and that after his 
father died he also farmed up to the fence and continued to farm up to the fence at the 
time of trial. R. 699 at 9-11. Veibell also presented the testimony of Bryce Ericksen that 
his father and brother farmed up to the fence on the Ericksen side from about 1935 to 
1963, when Bryce Ericksen left the farm. R. 700 at 30, 32. Thus, Veibell met the first 
requirement of boundary by acquiescence. But, that was as far as he got. 
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B. Veibell Did Not Show Mutual Acquiescence In the Line As a 
Boundary By Adjoining Landowners. 
This Court has made it clear that mere occupation up to the line is not 
enough; there must also be mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. " [I] f there is 
no uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary line the parties may not, knowing 
where the true boundary line is, establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another 
place." Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962). The Utah Court of 
Appeals has stated that "[acquiescence in use is not equivalent to acquiescence in a 
boundary." Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 1999 UT App. 366 ^ j 13 n.3, 993 
P.2d 229, 232 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Veibell has not proved mutual acquiescence. 
Veibell claimed that the first time he learned the fence was not the record 
boundary was in 1981. R. 699 at 11. Veibell, however, provided no evidence concerning 
any acquiescence by the Ericksens in the fence as the boundary. Veibell did not even 
testify about any silence by Durrell Ericksen concerning a claim that the fence was the 
boundary. See R. 699 at 9-15. He just provided his side of the acquiescence, which is not 
enough. 
Veibell's own testimony about understanding that the fence was the 
boundary is undermined by his admission that he knew a 1938 deed from Durrell 
Ericksen's parents to Veibell's parents had set the northern boundary of the Veibell 
property. This 1938 quit claim deed conveyed a strip of property 8.5 rods wide (about 
140 feet) that ran the entire length of the property between their parcels, and established 
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the boundary between the properties at 111.5 rods south of the section comer, not at the 
fence line. This transaction is evidenced by abstract of title 14418, item number 29, 
which is part of Defendant's Exhibit 21. Add. at 26. This is the same boundary—111.5 
rods south of the section comer—that is the northern boundary in the deed whereby 
Veibell obtained title to the property in 1958. See Def. Ex. 1; Add. at 1. Veibell testified 
that he was aware of the 1938 deed and that he knew it set the northern boundary. He 
testified: 
Q. Are you familiar at all with a transaction between the 
father of Durrell Ericksen and your father in 193 8 that 
actually established the top boundary line at 111.5 rods? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You are familiar with that? 
A. No. All I know of is that eight-and-a-half acres. That 
was quit claimed deeded in 1938, but he farmed it way before 
that. 
Q. Okay. And that quit claim deed-if I understand it 
right, that quit claim deed granted to your father the top - a 
kind of sliver across the top, about eight-and-a-half acres, is 
that right? 
A. Yes, uh-huh. 
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Q. And that's what set that boundary line at 111.5 rods? 
A. (Witness nodded his head.) 
R. 699 at 43-44; see also the abstract of the September 8, 1938 deed, which is part of Def. 
Ex. 21. Add. at 26. Because Veibell was aware of the 1938 deed and he knew that it set 
the northern boundary of his father's, and later his, property, there was no acquiescence 
even by Veibell in the fence as a boundary. 
In Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512 (Utah 1990), this Court held that mutual 
acquiescence was absent because the metes and bounds boundary had been set during a 
condemnation action to which one of the adjoining landowners and the predecessor of the 
other were parties. A survey had been prepared during the action that had noted a conflict 
between the metes and bounds description and the fence line, yet the metes and bounds 
description was used in setting the boundary. 788 P.2d at 513. The Court said this action 
negated any mutual acquiescence in anything but the metes and bounds description. More 
directly, even though the defendant was not a party to the condemnation action, this Court 
held that no acquiescence existed because he "was placed on notice of the existing 
boundary by the prior condemnation action, as well as by the metes and bounds 
property description contained in the warranty deed from his predecessor in 
interest, which was recorded at Bonacci's request." Id. 
Similarly, Veibell's father received a quit claim deed from the father of 
Durrell Ericksen setting the northern boundary of the Veibell property with a metes and 
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bounds description. Add. at 26. There is no mention of the fence in that description, or 
in the description by which Veibell obtained the property in 1958. Veibell knew the 
purpose of the quit claim deed was to establish the northern boundary of what his father 
held, and that is the same northern boundary set in the 1958 deed to Veibell. Def. Ex. 1; 
Add. at 1. Therefore, Veibell's father, and Veibell, were on notice of the metes and 
bounds description as the northern boundary and they could not have acquiesced in the 
fence as the boundary. 
At the very least, the 1938 deed shows that VeibelPs father and Durrell 
Ericksen's father both acquiesced in the metes and bounds description contained in that 
deed, and not in the fence line, as the boundary between the properties. In fact, other than 
their farming to the fence, the 1938 property description is the only evidence of their 
understanding, and that deed shows they understood the metes and bounds description 
controlled. As such, their periods of ownership cannot be used to show boundary by 
acquiescence. 
In any event, even absent the 1938 deed, Veibell failed to put on any 
evidence of mutual acquiescence in the fence as a boundary by his parents or Durrell 
Ericksen's parents. All that was presented about them was that they each farmed to the 
fence. R 699 at 9-11; R. 700 at 30-35. But, "[acquiescence in use is not equivalent to 
acquiescence in a boundary." Wilkinson Family Farm, 1999 UT App. 366 ]f 13 n.3, 993 
35 
P.2d at 232 n.3. Thus, Veibell did not show mutual acquiescence by his father or Durrell 
Ericksen's father. 
Veibell also did not put on any evidence of what Durrell Ericksen 
understood about the fence. He put Bryce Ericksen on, who testified he is a brother to 
Durrell Ericksen, and that he was around the farm from about 1935 to 1963. R. 700 
at 31, 33. Bryce Ericksen did not testify concerning his father's acquiescence in the fence 
as a boundary and he did not testify concerning his brother's acquiescence in the fence as 
a boundary. See R. 700 at 30-35. He simply testified that he—Bryce Ericksen—thought 
the fence was the boundary, but his understanding does not transfer to an understanding 
of his father or his brother. R. 700 at 33. 
What is critical when reviewing Bryce Ericksen's testimony is that the 
mutual acquiescence must be by "adjoining landowners" "in the line as a boundary." 
Jacobs, 917 P.2d at 1080. Bryce Ericksen was never an adjoining landowner. He 
testified that he thought he had purchased his father's property along with Durrell 
Ericksen in 1959 or 1960, but later admitted—when confronted with an abstract of title 
not listing him as having ever owned an interest in the property—that he did not know if 
he ever had part of the legal title before he left to go to school in 1963. R. 700 at 30, 
34-35. The abstract of title does not show him as ever owning an interest in the property; 
it only shows Durrell and Leola Ericksen. Def. Ex. 22; Add. at 28. Thus, that Bryce 
Ericksen may have understood the fence was the boundary does not establish that any 
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"adjoining landowner" with Veibell considered the fence line to be the boundary. That 
the Ericksens and Veibells may have farmed to the fence line is not enough. That Veibell 
himself understood the fence to be the boundary is not enough. He was required to show 
"that both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building, 
as the boundary of the adjacent parcels." Ault, 2002 UT 33 Tf 18,44 P.3d at 788 (italics in 
original). Veibell did not prove this. Thus, the district court's finding on this issue was 
clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
C. Veibell Did Not Show Mutual Acquiescence For A Long Period 
of Time. 
Durrell Ericksen acquired the property to the north of Veibell's in 1959 or 
1960, according to his brother. R. 700 at 30. Veibell acquired the property to the south in 
1958. Def. Ex. 1, Add. at 1. Even if Bryce Ericksen did own an interest in the property 
with Durrell Ericksen, which is refuted by Defendant's Exhibit 22, he testified himself 
that he only may have had an interest from about 1959 to 1963, which is not a sufficient 
amount of time to establish the mutual acquiescence required for a finding of boundary by 
acquiescence. Jacobs, 917 P.2d at 1080. Mr. Ericksen's four years as potentially an 
"adjoining landowner" is simply too short, and there was no evidence presented 
concerning Durrell Erickson's understanding before, during, or after that. Thus, the 
district court's finding of boundary acquiescence as to the East Triangle should be 
reversed. 
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D. Veibell Acquiesced In the Record Boundary for More Than 20 
Years, 
Besides Veibell not meeting his burden of proof on his boundary by 
acquiescence claim, he also acquiesced in the record boundary for more than 20 years, 
thus defeating any boundary by acquiescence that may have been established prior. 
"'When the parties agree that the line to which they occupy is not the true line and agree 
subsequently to ascertain the true boundary, the quality of the acquiescence is destroyed 
and no boundary is fixed by continued occupation.'" Ault, 2002 UT 33 f 18,44 P.3d at 
788 (quoting 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 83 (1997)). 
As made clear above, there is no evidence of mutual acquiescence by 
Durrell Ericksen before he died in 1978—not even of silence. The only evidence about 
what occurred after he died is evidence that the parties agreed the record boundary was 
the boundary. Veibell claims he did not learn until 1981 that the fence was not the record 
boundary, but in 1979 Veibell sold a half-acre lot to his son Craig Veibell that is situated 
precisely in the northeast corner of the recorded property description—right on the 
northern boundary established by both the 1938 quit claim deed and the 1958 deed to 
Veibell—and not in the corner established by the fence. See Def. Exs. 1, 3, and 21; Add. 
at 1, 3, 26; R. 699 at 36-38. That deed does not even mention the fence. Def. Ex. 3; 
Add. at 3. Veibell testified he knew it was right in the corner of what he owned, also 
negating his claim that he thought the fence was the boundary. R. 699 at 37. Later, he 
stated he just gave his son a lot on a hill that his son wanted, without reference to where it 
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fit in the recorded property description. R. 699 at 79. But, he said he knew, and he is 
charged with knowledge, that what he deeded to his son in 1979 fit precisely in the corner 
of the property he owned before that. Thus, he is also charged with knowledge that the 
fence was not the boundary. See Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d at 513 (defendant "was placed 
on notice of the existing boundary . . . by the metes and bounds property description 
contained in the warranty deed from his predecessor in interest"). 
Veibell admits that at least in 1981 he knew where the record boundary 
was. He also thereafter began to develop the property and had various plats drawn up in 
the 1990s using the correct record boundary as the northern boundary to his proposed 
development. See Def. Exs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11; Add. at 6-8, 11,12. He also deeded the 
property to a corporation and back to himself in 1998, using the record boundary as the 
north boundary, not the fence line. Def. Ex. 9; Add. at 9-10. 
In 1996, he sent a letter to the children of Durrell Ericksen asking to 
purchase the property that constitutes the East Triangle. Def. Ex. 4; Add. at 4. The 
Ericksens responded that they did not want to sell the parcel to him. Def. Ex. 5; Add. 
at 5. An offer to purchase disputed property shows the parties had not acquiesced in a 
boundary. Williams v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1978). 
Not only did Veibell present no evidence that the Ericksens acquiesced in 
the fence as the boundary dividing their properties, he recognized himself for 20 years 
that the record boundary was the boundary. By such recognition, '"the quality of the 
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acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary is fixed by continued occupation."5 Ault, 2002 
UT 33 \ 18, 44 P.3d at 788 (quoting 12 Am, Jur. 2d Boundaries § 83 (1997)). By 
acquiescing in the record boundary as the boundary for 20 years, any prior boundary 
established by acquiescence should be considered altered thereby. 
In any event, Veibell's actions in deeding to his son the parcel precisely in 
the corner of the recorded property description, in drawing up all the plat maps showing 
the record boundary as the boundary, and in attempting to buy the East Triangle from the 
Ericksens and their rejection of the offer, emphasize that he knew the Ericksens had never 
acquiesced in the fence as the boundary. 
Veibell did not meet his burden of proof on his boundary by acquiescence 
claim. And, if the Court believes he did, he thereafter acquiesced in the record boundary 
for 20 years reestablishing the record boundary as the boundary. The district court should 
be reversed on this claim. 
IV. VEIBELL DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM TO THE WEST 
TRIANGLE. 
Veibell states in his brief that he will only appeal the district court's ruling 
as to the West Triangle if the Partnership appeals and briefs the issue of the East Triangle. 
Appellant's Brief at 28-29. This strategy, however, has resulted in the waiver of the 
Veibell's right to appeal the district court's findings as to the West Triangle. Rule 24(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[r]eply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." This Court has also held that 
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"[a]s a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on 
appeal...." Romrellv. Zions First Natl Bank, 611 P.2d392, 395 (Utah 1980). The 
Court considered the issue raised in Romrell only because it was a matter of plain error 
that required reversal. 
The same is not true of Veibell's appeal of the findings concerning the West 
Triangle. His failure to brief those issues in his opening brief was calculated and 
intentional, and was a ploy to get the Partnership to not appeal the issues related to the 
East Triangle. It will leave the Partnership without an opportunity to answer whatever 
arguments Veibell would raise as to the West Triangle. The Court should not set a 
precedent condoning such conduct by allowing Veibell to raise his arguments concerning 
the West Triangle for the first time in his reply brief. The Court should rule that Veibell 
has waived the right to appeal that issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Partnership asks this Court to affirm the district court's ruling on its 
reformation claim, to reverse the district court's ruling on Veibell's boundary by 
acquiescence claim as to the East Triangle, and to rule that Veibell has waived his right to 
appeal the district court's ruling as to the West Triangle. 
Dated this 21st day of October, 2002. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Lar 
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of October, I mailed two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant in the U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
S:\WPDATA\PLEADING\ERICKSEN.APPEAL BRIEF (with tables).wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
?& s_2*2Q_ TIME 2^5^- PM HQQif-. 236 
MARGARET R.EVANS
 r'BOX &OERCOUN1Y RECOROE 
msBmfx DEED< 
LIELE H« VEIBELLj wido^ VmkV* ZULESj WEBfiELL N* VEIBELL^  . • .'• 
a single man; anct IBM;A# VEIBEIIII, also known asr Erma 'A» Veiqel.1,. 
Cache .State of Utah; hsrcby grantor 3 of Eogan v ^X3dintyo£ Cache v State f t ; ere  
T j ; igaXM ITEIBELII ^ ?EfflEEL« husband andL wifes 
as joint tenants and; not as tenants in common^  tfith ful l rights 
, of -ism&Sx^ •• v.;-: 
grantees of :" Beaver-Dam^ Box Elder County, Iffcaft 
fair tit aunt of Twenty Thousandand^ no/lda«^«-~ Dollars • , „
 t 
the following described tract .: of land In v Box E l d e r County. State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the Northwest 
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 23 ^ Township 
12 Norths .Range 2West of the Salt Lake Meridian^ 
i »WI<Mi ) : S n i ( ;) f I M ; H v ( » ) M n «B^<V / - f 
thence ITortK20$»5 rods*: thence West 160 rods to this 
place of beg i^^ -
~e presence of 
^wMszSEESSz. 
•{jieiMdtarowrBB 




; ; c < i i a i i r i ^ ^ 
S 90°00'00" W 
160.00 Rods 
Veibell-1958 
9.082.260.00 Sq. Feet 
208.500 Acres 
N 90°00'00H E 
160.00 Rods 
RHNOOOll 
COPY FOR YOUR RtUUKU=> 
WARRANTY DEED 
(JOINT TENANCY FORM) 
J . ALTON VEIBELL and GRETHE C. VEIBELL, husband and wife, 
grantor of County of 
State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship, 
grantees of 
for the sum of Tan dollars *nd other valuable consideration 
the following described tract of land in Cach* County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 1839*75 feat South along the Section line and 49.5 feet West 
froe the Northeaat corner of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 West Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian and running South 147.6 feet; thence West 147.6 feet; thence 
North 147.6 feet; thence East 147.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
This Warranty Deed executed in duplicate iw .<_ i-
Cache and Box Elder Counties Q U p i l M t e f o r »i»ultaneoue recording in both a. 




STATE OF UTAH 
County of Cache 
On the 27 th
 d a y o f ^ ^ 
A.D. 19 79 personally appeared before me 
J. Alton Veibell and Grethe C. Veibell 
huaband and vifa, »"««n, 
who duly 
executed the same. 
/ / ^ . . . ' . . . . • ' , ; *v ' No^y Publi 
«« 9 March 1983 
ln
 Logan, Utah 
-
 rt-'RECORDING DATA Entry No. 4 2 1 7 7 4







5TATE OF UTAH 5
 c t 
JOUHT? Or CACHE) w V 
Mu28 4 u P H ' 
MtCHA.'.-:i. I . CLE ED 
COUNTY rtE^JROER 
D E P U T Y ^ a . 
LAND TITLE COMPANY BOOK 2 4 7 PAGEITM-
May 16, 1996 
Leola J. Ericksen Family Ltd. Partnership 
c/o Charlotte Ericksen Nelson 
Beaver Dam, Utah 
Dear Charlotte: 
We have evaluated the options available to us for the alignment of the access road serving our High 
Country Estates subdivision. 
One option is to place the road where it presently exists, running westward from 400 West past the 
north side of Craig Veibell's home and parallel to the established fence line which separates our 
property from yours. This is our preferred location. 
A second option readily available to us is to angle the access road slightly southward to join 400 West 
on the south side of Craig's home, thereby avoiding any contestable location. 
Either location will work for us. We would, however, like to propose a boundary settlement which 
would facilitate our preferred option, and compensate you acceptably. 
The sliver of land which might be contested is a long, wedge-shaped piece running from 400 West 
to a point near our northwest property corner and containing 4.53 acres. There is smaller, mirror-
image sliver extending on westward from that point containing 1.75 acres which, by record, is in our 
ownership. 
In order to both unify our respective boundaries consistent with the established fence line and provide 
an incentive for you, we propose to: 
1) exchange the 1.75 acre sliver in our ownership for your quit-claiming any interest in a 
corresponding 1.75 acres in the contestable parcel, and 
2) for the remaining 2.78 acres of the contestable parcel, negotiate in good faith with you and 
compensate you in cash for any differential betweeen relative values. 
We request your response to this suggested settlement by June 1, 1996. 
Sincerely, 
J, Alton Veibell 
RHN00164 
June 10,1996 
X Alton Veibell 
14015 N. 400 W. 
Beaver Dam, UT 84306 
Dear Alton; 
We received your letter of May 16 and appreciate your contacting us concerning the 
development of your High Country Estates subdivision We have given this matter 
considerable time and review and find that our original decision has not changed. 
As far as our position is concerned, it remains as stated to you in our letter of June 17, 
1995. Basically "It is our decision not to sell our land next to your property nor to 
participate in the proposed development that has been outlined for that area." 
This decision allows us to utilize the full acreage belonging to us, which follows the 
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When Recorded Mail To: 
J. Alton Veibell 
14015 N. 400 W. 
Beaver Dam, UT 84306 
QUIT CLATM T)T?.YV 
121458 Bk 0700 Pg 132:7 
LiAm Adats, Box Elder County Recorder 
12/28/19% l£:37pf FEE: 17.00 Dep:«W 
Rec'd For: J ALTON VEIKLL 
CACHE BOX DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. of Beaver Dam, Cache County, 
State of Utah, Grantor hereby quit claims to J. ALTON VEIBELL and 
GRETHE C. VEIBELL, husband and wife as joint tenants, for the sum 
of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, all 
rights and interest in and to the parcel of land legally 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and included herein-by 
reference; 
1998, 
WITNESS the hand of the Grantor this ^? day of December, 
$ ALTON VEIBELL 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
) COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the J^2 day of December, 1998, personally appeared 
before me J. Alton Veibell who acknowledged that he is president 
of Cache Box Development Co. and acknowledged that Cache Box 
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EXHIBIT " A " 
HQPERTY DESCRIPTTfW 
I Alton And Grette C. Veibell 
Located in the East K of Section 23, T12N, R2W, SLB&M. 
* x n ^ ™ ^ * P 0 i n t ^ * e S e c t i o n L i n e ^ ^ feetS 0-10' 27"E from 
o . , L m e r . o n 2 3 ' T 1 2 N ' BSW. SLB&M; and running tfaence 
* ? i ^ » o o f ^ i e C ? 0 n ^ 3 ' 4 7 4 6 4 f e e t to * e SE Corner of said section 
23 thence S 9°46 53»w along the South Section Line of add Section 1,823.25 
,089.33 feet fcence N 5°15WE 1,092.20 feetto an old fence line; Ihence along 
^ d fence hne N 81°34'15'<E 220.70 feet thence East 1,630.27 feetmore or lesslo 
toe Point of Beginning. 
«** p i f ! T ^ 8 6 ( 3 ) \°rT p a f C c I s 0 M i e d ^ D- S c o t t Mo*<> Kevin F. Fowkes 
^ S S f r ^ T " r l r ( 2 ) °-5 aCre p a r c e l s o w n e d b? C r a i§ A. Veibell 
S £ ? £ C t a , t e fm : L E S S 2-8° ^ p a r c e I o w n e d ^ RHN Corporation; 
LESS 2.93 acre parcel owned by Aldrid M. Christensen; LESS 2 parcels owned by 
Wfflow Creek Water Company, LC described as follows: PARCEL I = Beginning 
atfbe well stem located approximately 1345 feet West and 1375 feet North of the 
SE comer of Section 23.T12N, R2W, SLB&M; and running thence aronnd the 
perimeter of a square parcel enclosed by equal 20.00 foot sides with bearings 
^ f \ ™ ! ° J™ ,WeSt * * *" S i d e s 10-00 f e e t P e d i c u l a r from the center 
of the Well Stem; together with a 20.00 foot wide access road right-of-way to the 
nearest pubhc road. Contains 400 s.f or 0.009 acre; PARCEL 2 = Beginning at a 
Point on^theSouth section line 1,289.08 feet N 89>46'53»E of the SE comer of 
Section 23, T12N, R2W,SLB&M; and running thence N 21«44'06"E 99.39 feet 
? ? ! 8 o ^ ^ h ^ ° X / l d e r C°mty L m ^ W e N 55'29-44-W51.27feet thence 
? • • 1 n i i i 0 t h e ^ S0Uth s e C t i o n ^ fcen« N 89°46'53"E 53.84 
feetto the P.O.B. Contains 0.1321 acre; LESS the Home and Shop parcels 
1 ° A ^ :1V a C r e S 0 W n 6 d b y l Ahaa "* ^ t o C- Veibell; LESS County Road R/W of 1.40 acres. 
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T H E A D O R E D E L O Y Z I L L E S , and V E R A V . Z I L L E S , 
H u s b a n d and wife ; C a c h e C o u n t y , U tah 
J . A L T O N V E I B E L L and G R E T H E C . V E I B E L L , 
HusVand. and, wife ; B o x E l ^ e r C o , , Utah 
" J V . , *r « > - *"- C U N D f F F . 
W E N D E L L N . V E I B E L L a n ^ N A N C Y / V E I B E L L , 
%
 H u s b a n d and wi fe , W e b e r C o u n t y , U t a h ; 
L I L L I E N . V E I B E L L , w i d o w , B o x E l d e r C o u n t y , Utah 
G r a n t o r s , 
C O N V E Y a n d W A R R A N T t o ; 
H u s b a n d and wi fe , ^LoganJ ' - n . ^ '—i , U t a h , 
in J o i n t t e n a n c y with full r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p , and not a s 
T e n a n t s in c o m m o n , 
G r a n t e e s , 
fo r the s u m of T e n D o l l a r s and o t h e r good and va luable c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
t h e following d e s c r i b e d land in B Q X E l d e r C o u n t y , Stafce of Utah-.1 
P a r t of the East-half." of S e c t i o n 2 3 , T o w n s h i p 12 N o r t h ^ 
R a n g e 2 W e s t , SLM*.1, d e s c r i b e d f u r t h e r a s : 
Beg inn ing at a point in the N - S c e n t e r l i n e of sa id S e c t i o n 
2 3 , s a i d point be ing S o u t h *2Q07,8 feet and W e s t 2 6 4 5 . 3 feet 
( S o u t h 1 1 1 . 5 r o d s and W e s t 160 r o d s by r e c o r d ) f rom the 
N E C o r n e r of sa id S e c t i o n ? 3 ; t h e n c e N o r t h 8 1 ° 3 6 ^ E 
8 0 7 . 5 feet a long an exis t ing f ence l ine ; t h e n c e S 05° 15 ' W 
, 1 0 9 1 . 8 fee t ; t h e n c e S 15°59 r E 1 0 8 9 . 5 feet ; T h e n c e S 0 7 ° 0 7 ! 
W 1 3 3 2 . 0 feet m o r e o r l e s s to the S o u t h line of sa id 
s e c t i o n 2 3 , t h e n c e W e s t 9 2 7 . 7 feet a long sa id S o u t h line of 
S e c t i o n 2'3, to the N - S c e n t e r l i n e of sa id S e c t i o n 2 3 ; t h e n c e 
N o r t h 3 3 4 8 , 4 feet ( 2 0 8 . 5 r o d s by r e c o r d ) to the point of 
b e g i n n i n g . Con ta in ing in all 7 5 . 8 a c r e s , m o r e o r l e s s . 
S u b j e c t to Oil and G a s l e a s e ; G r a n t o r s r e t a in all m ine ra l 
r i g h t s to a b o v e l a n d . 
W I T N E S S , t he h a n d s of sa id g r a n t o r s this 
' 1 9 6 7 . 
10th d a y of A p r i l , 
T h e a d o r e D e L o y / Z f l l e s -* 
V e r a V , Ztf£ s 
band and wife JHus   
J/AlWnJ/eibell " 
/Oreth'e 
 C . Veibel l 
H u s b a n d and wife 
T S T T X T A A A A O 
BOOK 2 0 5 PAGE310 
Wendell N . Veibell 
sib ell . . . . -j;^. 
iusband-and wne, 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER \ 
On the ,0th day C A P . 1 , 1967 personal y a P e . _ 
On the iUtn aay «i i-^*»i - \/e;bell, 
, u- -l Grethe C. Veibell and Lillie N. Ve.bell, 
•1 •iAilton-Veibell and his wife Grethe <~. 
^yhto?8sf««e»t»d the same- ^ ^ i ^7L/J^ 
^u^ds 
NSanTPubhc, reimo ^
 1 9 ? 0 
Commission expires Juiy « , 
53ATE OF UTAH ) 
" l $ ^ ' j # CACHE j 
S S 
oViajn the 10th day of April, 1967, P«-« 
• ^ 1
 D e L o y Zilles and his wife Vera V. Zilles, the signers of 
W^I^F
 f K d u l v acknowledged to me that they executed 
V ^ | ^ ^ r t h i n instrument who duly acknowie a 
Commission expires, o-V-' 
s s 
P©F.UTAH ') 
W—-H. V*-i - * - H-f ° ~ VI „ 1 1 — 
-222£^^i_^-^^frnjtah 
Commission expi res .^- / / i>7. 
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SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Erwin 0. Moser, residing in~Logan,'Cache County Utat, do hereby =^«fy t h a t ^ - J ^ g ^ * 
Professional Engineer, and Und Surveyor, that I hold Certificate «°; *° • P
 m s h s e t a t the 
laws of the State of Utah, and that I have made a survey of the property shown 
request of J. Durrel Erickson and described*as follows: 
Part of the East-half of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and further described as follows: 
Beginning af a point in the H=3 centerline of said Section 23, said point being f ^ " Z O O T ^ f e e t 
and V«5tS»5.3«r«t (South 111.5.rods and West 160 rods by record) from the NE co.n., o 
Action 23; thence N 81*36- E 805.7 feet along an' existing fence line; thence S 05 lJ « 
1091.8' f.at, thence S 15°59' E 1089-5 feet; thence S 07 W ' V 1332. feet more or 1 » t o h ^ 
South line of said Section 23; thence West 972.7'feet along said South line of Seewo j 
1 W eenterllne .of said Section 23; thence North 3 3 ^ feet (.208.5 rods by record; 
af beginning. Containing in all 75.8 acres more or less. 
I further certify that no improvements on the above described property «cro*ch uporv tt>* ^jacsnt 
poverties and that no improvements on the adjacent properties encroach upon the above describee 
property. 
FViFlneer and •' • ! } / Oe. $ 3 V;.- Survey for; J, 'Durrel Erickson.. 
RHN00010 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into at Logan, Cache County,l 
Utah, the 20th day of April, 1967, by and between J. ALTON VEIBELL 
and GRETHE C, VEIBELL, husband and wife, of Tremonton, Box Elder 
County, Utah, hereinafter referred to and designated as Sellers, 
and J, IMKEHL ERICKSJEN and LEQLA J, ERICKSEN, husband and wife, 
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with full rights 
of survivorship, of Logan, Cache County, Utah, hereinafter re-
ferred to and designated as Buyers; 
WITNESSETH: 
1. For the consideration and on the terms and conditions 
herein set forth, the Sellers agree to sell and the Buyers agree , 
to purchase that certain real property located in Box Elder 
County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows a 
Part of the East Half of Section 23, Township 12 North, 
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian—Beginning at a point 
in the North-South center line of said Section 23, said 
point being South 2007.8 feet and .West 2645.3 feet 
(South 111.5 rods and West 100 rods by record) from the 
Northeast corner of said Section 23; thence North 81° 
38f East 805,7 feet along an existing fence line; thence 
South 05° 15' West 1091.8 feet; thence South 07° 07' 
West 1332.0 feet more or less to the South line of said 
Section 23; thence West 972.7 feet along said South line 
of Section 23 to the North-South center line of said 
Section 23; thence North 3348.4 feet (208.5 rods by 
record) to the point o£ beginning, containing in all 
75.8 acres more or les^, 
2. The Buyers agree to pay for said real property the prin^ 
cipal sum of Thlrteea Thousand One Hundred Twenty Five f*and no/100 
Dollars ($13,125.00), payable in lawful money of the United States) 
of America at the residence of Sellers in Tremonton, Utah, or at 
such other place as the Sellers or their successors may direct 
in writing, strictly within the following times, to-wit: 
$2,5Q0.00 cash upon the execution and delivery of this 
Agreement, receipt thereof being hereby acknowledged, 
and the balance of the purchase prtce in the amount of 
$10,625.00, plus interest on all unpaid portions thereof, 
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from May 1, 1967, 
shall be paid on or before April 1, 1968. Any prepayments 
on said $10,625.00 shall be applied first to payment of 
interest and the balance to reduction of principal. 
3. Possession of said premises shall be delivered to Buyers 
concurrent with the execution of this Agreement. 
4. Sellers represent that real property taxes and all 
assessments on said premises are paid through December 31, 1966. 
The Buyers agree to pay real property taxes from and after Janu-
ary 1, 1967; and in addition thereto, Buyers agree to pky all 
RHN00186 
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assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be 
assessed or levied from and after January 1, 1967, and to hold 
Sellers harmless from any loss, demand, or claim arising from 
Buyers' failure, refusal, or neglect so to do. 
5. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against 
said premises other than those herein provided for or referred to 
°*i* A # ev*B"t aay liens or encumbrances other vthan herein pro-
vided for shall hereafter AMpq* against the property by the acts 
or neglect of the Sellers; then the Buyers, at their option, may 
pay and discharge the same and receive credit on the amount 
remaining due hereunder, 
6. Concurrent with the execution and delivery of this Agree-, 
ment, Sellers agree to execute in favor of Buyers as joint tenantd 
and not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship, a1 
Warranty Deed to said described premises. Upon payment in full OJB 
the purchase price, Sellers agree to deliver said Warranty Deed td 
Buyers with revenue stamps in the amount pf $14.85 attached there-} 
to, Sellers further agree upon the delivery of said Warranty Deed 
to Buyers to deliver to Buyers ao abstract of title continued to 
the date of the delivery oi< t^e'Deed at Sellers' expense. Sellers! 
agree to convey to Buyers a marketable title to said real property^ 
free and clear of all liens, defects, and encumbrances, except | 
such liens, defects, or encumbrances as might accrue against said 
property by reason of the acts or neglect of the Buyers, or such 
encumbrances as are herein provided for, 
7. In case of the failure of the Buyers to pay all payments 
promptly when due, whether of principal, interest, or taxes, it 
being agreed that time is of the essence of this Agreement, or in 
case or their failure to perform any other covenant or agreement 
promptly when the same should be performed, then at the option of 
V? !; e r s ' t h e y **7 «««*•*<* this Agreement and be released from 
ail obligations hereunder, thereupon a U payments made and all 
improvements erected thereon shall be forfeited to the Sellers as 
ana tor liquidated damages and as rental for said premises; and 
t x f r 8 o ^ r*take possession of said property; or, at the option 
o* the Sellers, they may specifically enforce the provisions of 
this Agreement in an appropriate action, or they may sue for the 
purchase price in any qompetept court and for this purpose may 
declare all unpaid payments immediately due and payable. 
H + ?; 4Th e B u y! r s a a d Sellers each agree that should they 
Tu *UIv ? ?ay,of t h e covenants or agreements contained herein, 
that the defaulting party shall
 p a y all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee which may arise or accrue 
xrom enforcing this Agreement or in obtaining possession of the 
premises covered hereby; or in pursuing any remedy provided here-
under or by the statutes pf the State of Utah, whether such rem-
edy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise. 
. *; „The terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon and 
snail inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their respec-
tive heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns. 
10. The Sellers retain all mineral rights to the above described 
rpal property* 
V?"HJ "n **** *vent this property Ncomes on for resale the Sellers 
hav* the first option to repurchase from Buyer, at fair market price. 
RHN00187 
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IN WITNESS TOBBEOF, the parties hkve hereto set the ir hands 
OB the day and year f i r s t above written. 
WsuVtJ & 









ELDER COUNTY TREASURER'S OFFICE, BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH 
THIS NUMBER ON ALL CORRESPONDENCE 
*CEtNO, DIST 
-038-0005 101 
THIS OFFICE WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE IF YOU PAY ON PROPERTY OTHER THAN YOUR OWN. 
LEOLA J ERICKSEN FAMILY LTD P 
228 WEST 4TH SO 
LOGAN, UT 8 4 3 2 1 
TWP 12N, R 2W, SLM, SD PT BEING S 
2 0 0 7 . 8 FT & W 2 6 4 5 . 3 FT FRM NE COR 
OF SD SEC, N 8 1 * 3 6 ' E 8 0 7 . 5 FT ALG 
AN EXIST FENCE L I N E , S 0 5 * 1 5 ' W 
1 0 9 1 . 8 F T , S 1 5 * 5 9 ' E 1 0 8 9 . 5 F T , S 
0 7 * 0 7 ' W 1 3 3 2 . 0 FT M/L TO S LINE OF 
SD SEC, W 9 2 7 . 7 FT ALG SD S LINE OF 
SD SEC, TO N-S C/L OF SD SEC, N 
3 3 4 8 . 4 FT TO BEG. CONTG 7 5 , 8 0 ACS. 
FOR COMPLETE LEGAL DESCRIPTION CONTACT RECORDER'S OFFICE 
MORTGAGE HOtPER 
PAID Box
 Elder £°"te R. A, 
C o
- - - : - r , 
reas Urer 
H I S PROPERTY MAY BE SUBJECT TO REAPPRAISAL NEXT YEAR * 
DE.;- ;: •:^:&mzmmzmmm^ : :^*M: GREENBELT REAL ESTAT 
$0£A&.mg8&M$iMK::: <:-^'^ 
^:^m^*mm®m 
7 5 . 8 0 
p l i j ^ S I g l ^ ^ 
4 , 3 0 7 
4 , 3 0 7 
wmmMmmmmm 364 
364 1 
wmmmmAamimm 3 . 2 4 
3 . 2 4 1 
TAXING ENTITIES PUBLIC B U D S T ^ RATE TAXABLE VALUE TAXAMOUNT / 
SQUITO ABATEMENT DISTRICT 
UNTY L I B R A R Y F U N D 
t E L D E R C O U N T Y G E N E R A L F U N D 
X E L D E R S C H O O L D I S T R I C T 
S I C S C H O O L L E V Y 
L T I - C O U N T Y A S S N G & C O L L E C T 
AR R I V E R W A T E R C O N S V D I S T 
A S S N G / C O L L E C T I N G 
1 2 / 0 1 / 9 9 6:00 PM 37 S 600 W BRIGHAM 
1 2 / 1 4 / 9 9 6:00 PM BE COUNTY COURTHOUsfe 
1 2 / 1 4 / 9 9 6:00 PM BE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
1 2 / 1 5 / 9 9 7 :00 PM 102 W FOREST BRIGHAM 
. 0 0 0 1 9 7 
. 0 0 0 1 7 4 
. 0 0 1 4 0 4 
. 0 0 4 6 8 8 
. 0 0 1 8 4 0 
. 0 0 0 2 2 2 
, 0 0 0 1 7 2 









99 Property Taxes unpaid or postmarked 
ter November 30, 1999 are delinquent, 
penalty of 2% or $10.00, whichever is greater, 
.11 be added. From January 1. interest will be 
.arqed at 6% above the Federal Discount Rate 






TOTAL TAX DUE 
. 0 7 
.06 
. 5 1 
1 . 7 1 
. 6 7 
. 0 8 
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$ 3 . 2 4 
Make Check Payable to: BOX ELDER COUNTY TREASURER 
01 SOUTH MAIN 
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° 18 Sq. Feut1 
Acres 
<Abstrart rf litle 
Prepared by 
PHILUPS-HANSEN 
BONDED ABSTRACTERS r ' M " - , r * ' ' ™ ™*~l ^ TITLE INSURANCE 
land Title (ompany 5 4 ^ 1 S 
Member - American Title Ass'n. 
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH 
Caption: 
To th certain tract of land situated in the County of Box Elder, State of Utah, to wit: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 1 1 1 . 5 RODS SOUTH OF THE NORTHWEST CORNER 
OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 23 , TOWNSHIP 12 NORTH, RANGE 
2 WEST, SAIT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 208 .5 
RODS, THENCE EAST 160 ORDS, THENCE NORTH 2 0 8 . 5 RODS, THENCE WEST 
160 RODS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING, CONTAINING 2 0 8 . 5 ACRES. 
(For Plat of above, see Blue Print following Certificate.) 
Representing IgJUyerS T i t l e I n s u r a n c e ( p r o r a t i o n Richmond, Virginia 
A b s t r a c t N o . 1 4 4 1 8 I t em No. ^ R e c o r d e r ' s No. 57276f 
Recorded Nov. 7, 1938 a t 1 1 . 5 5 a . m . , i n Book 42 of Deeds , paae 282 
Kind of I n s t : QUIT CLAIM DEED, d a t e d S e p t . 8 , 1 9 3 8 . C o n : - $ 1 . 0 0 
GRANTOR:-
Michael trickson and Ethel M. Erickson, his wife 
GRANTEE:-
James Weibell also known as Jens Vveibell 
SIGNED:-
Michael Erickson 
Ethel 2i Erickson 
vJTNESS:-
C. Henry Nielsen 




...hereby convey and quit claim to.... 
land in Box Elder County, Utah. 
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the Northeast corner 
of Sec. 23, T. 12 N. R. 2 W. S.L.M., running thence West 160 
rods, thence South 8.5 rods, thence East 160 rods, thence North) 
8.5 rods to the place of beginning, contg. 8.5 acres, more or 
less. 




m . . ^.*2®es&***;--: - ' --^SS^ j:Uy^- • ./- • ^ v ^ V 
ihe following described tract of land situate in Box 
1&1 dea?v_ Co unt^ JJtah, t o-wit: 
~ v -' Beginning at the North-east Corner of the North-
east Quarter, of Section Twenty-three (23), Township 
Twelve (IE) North of Range Two (2) West of the Salt 
Lake Meridian, thence South 111-1/2 rods; thence Wess.t 






* l i t *•••• $. 
f 
Hi/' 
LEE AND DUNN 
LICENSED ABSTRACTERS FOR BOX ELDER CO. { {) f\ Q ^ 
BRIGHAM CITY, U T A H 
Abstract No. 1 4 4 2 0 Item No.°^ Recorder's No* 2072h 
Recorded Jan. 19, 1965 at 1:15 p.m., in Book 188, page S-&3 *f3 
jKind of Inst: WARRANTY DEED, dated Jan. 30, 1955 Con:-$10.00 
GRANTORS:-
Joseph A. Ericksen and wife, LaVona J. Ericksen 
GRANTEE:~ 
Durell Ericksen and wife Leola J. Ericksen, as joint tenants 
and not as tenants in common, with full right of survivorship 
S1GNEL:-
JosephA. Ericksen 




hereby convey and warrant to.... 
I land in Box Elder County, Utah 
Beq. 23 rods South of the NW Cor. of NEi of Sec. 23, T. 12 N., 
R. 2 W., SLB&M, th. running S. 88| rods, th. E. 160 rods, 
th. N« llli rods, thc SW along road to beginning, and cont. 
100 acres. 
And other lanas. 
Reserving and excepting to the grantors th'e oil rights to the 
































WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins #4854 
Richard J. Armstrong #7461 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHN Corporation, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
J. ALTON VEIBELL and WILLOW CREEK ; 
WATER COMPANY, L.C., a Utah Limited ; 
Liability Company, ] 
Defendant. ] 
J. ALTON VEIBELL and GRETHE ] 
VEIBELL, ; 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ] 
RHN CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; ] 
LEOLA J. ERICKSEN FAMILY LIMITED ; 
PARTNERSHIP; CLARENCE RICHARDS; ; 
LODEES RICHARDS; CHARLOTTE ; 
NELSON; TERRI HOWARD and ; 
GERALD HOWARD, } 
Third-Party Defendants. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) FOLLOWING BENCH TRIAL 
) Civil No. 980100719 




J. ALTON VEIBELL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LEOLA J. ERICKSEN FAMILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; all persons 
claiming any right, title, or interest in the 
following property in Box Elder County, 
Utah: Beginning at a Point 1834.75 feet 
SO0 10'27"E and 1629.34 feet S89° 49,33"W 
from the NE corner of Section 23, T12N, 
R2W, SLB&M, and running then West 
1009.35 feet more or less to the center line 
of Section 23, then SO010f27"E along the 
center of section line 150.19 feet more feet 
more or less to a point in line with a line 
bearing N81° 31,59,,E from the P.O.B., 
thenN81°3r59"E 1020.01 feet more or 
less to the Point of Beginning. Containing 
1.74 Acres more or less. 
Defendants. 
Bench trial was held October 12-13, 2000 in this matter on the claims remaining 
between the Leola J. Ericksen Family Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") and J. Alton 
Veibell ("Veibell"). All other matters were either dismissed earlier by the Court or settled by the 
parties. Larry S. Jenkins appeared for the Partnership and Russell Cline appeared for Veibell. 
Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, heard the testimony of the witnesses, 
and hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
2 
0640 
FINDINGS OF FACT ON PARTNERSHIP'S REFORMATION CLAIM 
1. On or about April 10, 1967, Veibell transferred property to J. Durell and 
Leola J. Ericksen by way of warranty deed. The warranty deed, which was admitted as 
Defendants' Exhibit 12, contained a property description prepared by an Edwin U. Moser (the 
"Moser description"), who had surveyed the property. The warranty deed also stated that the 
parcel conveyed to the Ericksens contained "in all 75.8 acres, more or less." The Moser 
description contained in the warranty deed reads as follows: 
Part of the East-half of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 
West, SLM., described further as: 
Beginning at a point the N-S centerline of said Section 23, said 
point being South 2007.8 feet and West 2645.3 feet (South 111.5 
rods and West 160 rods by record) from the NE Corner of said 
Section 23; thence North 81 °36' E 807.5 feet along an existing 
fence line; thence S 05°15' W 1091.8 feet; thence S 15°59' E 
1089.5 feet; Thence S 07°07' W 1332.0 feet more or less to the 
South line of said section 23, thence West 927.7 feet along said 
South line of Section 23, to the N-S centerline of said Section 23; 
thence North 3348.4 feet (208.5 rods by record) to the point of 
beginning. Containing in all 75.8 acres, more or less. 
2. The Ericksens and the Veibells also executed a Real Estate Contract 
evidencing the transaction. The Real Estate Contract, which was admitted as Defendants 
Exhibit 13, contained essentially the same property description and also stated that the Veibells 
agreed to transfer a parcel "containing in all 75.8 acres more or less." 
3. The Real Estate Contract also recited a purchase price for the property of 
$13,125. Mr. Veibell testified that the parties intended a price per acre of $ 175. The Court 
takes notice that $13,125 divided by 75 equals $175. 
4. The Surveyor's Certificate regarding the Moser description, which was 
3 
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admitted as part of Defendant's Exhibit 12, also states that the parcel described contains "in all 
75.8 acres, more or less." 
5. J. Durell and Leola J. Ericksen, were the father and mother of the limited 
partners of the Partnership, except that one of the limited partners is the Estate of Leola J. 
Ericksen. Durell Ericksen died in 1978 and Leola Ericksen placed the property in the Partnership 
in 1987 before her death in 1990. 
6. The Ericksens and the Partnership have paid property taxes on 75.8 acres 
since the transfer occurred in 1967. Veibell has not paid property taxes on any of the 75.8 acres 
purportedly transferred by the 1967 warranty deed. 
7. During the course of this litigation, in the spring of 2000, the Partnership 
discovered that an error existed in the Moser description. Mr. Veibell also was not aware of the 
error until the Partnership sought to amend its third-party counterclaim to allege a claim for 
reformation of the warranty deed. 
8. The Moser description does not close, and as used in the warranty deed 
from the Veibells to the Ericksens, the deed description overlaps nearly 10 acres onto property 
never owned by Mr. Veibell to the west of what Mr. Veibell owned in 1967. 
9. The Moser description can be made to close in two different ways: (i) by 
extending the 807.5 foot call from the point of beginning along the then existing (in 1967) fence 
line, which forms the northern boundary of the parcel, to a distance needed to close the 
description, or (ii) by shortening the 927.7 call along the southern boundary of the parcel by an 
amount so that the description closes. The first option would make the southern boundary of the 
4 
parcel 927.7 feet long, identical to the call in the deed, while the second option would make the 
southern boundary only 816.75 feet long. 
10. The evidence shows that if the second option were chosen and the 927.7 
foot call along the southern boundary is shortened to 816.75 feet, the Partnership would be left 
with less than 65 acres. Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 and Defendant's Exhibit 20 contain drawings 
representative of what the parcel would look like if the second option were chosen. 
11. Shortening the southern boundary of the Moser description so that the 
description closes would also leave the Partnership without access across its own property to the 
southeast corner of its property. 
12. Selecting the first option, lengthening the north boundary call of the Moser 
description along the then existing fence line until the description closes, would create a parcel 
containing approximately 73.028 acres. That would also make the southern boundary 927.7 feet 
long, consistent with the Moser description in the deed, and would allow the Partnership access 
across its own property to the southeast corner of its property. Defendant's Exhibit 18 is a 
drawing representative of what the parcel would look like if this option were chosen. 
13. The Court finds that the Partnership has shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that a mutual mistake occurred in the 1967 warranty deed to the Ericksens. 
14. The parties intended to transfer about 75 acres, yet the Moser description, 
if read as Veibell urges, describes less than 65 acres. 
15. The intent to transfer about 75 acres is shown by the plain language of the 
warranty deed, the Real Estate Contract, and the Surveyor's Certificate. The language "75.8 
acres, more or less" cannot be interpreted to mean less than 65 acres as Veibell urges. 
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16. This intent to transfer 75 acres is also shown by the purchase price of 
$13,125. Mr. Veibell testified the price per acre for the sale was $175 per acre, and $13,125 
divided by 175 is 75. 
17. Thus, the Court finds that to give effect to the intent of the parties, the 
Moser description contained in the warranty deed must be reformed to be consistent with 
Defendant's Exhibit 18. This description will come closer to the existing fence than the 
description urged by Veibell and is closer to 75 acres than the description urged by Veibell. 
Reforming the warranty deed in this way will reflect the intent of the parties. 
18. Reforming the warranty deed in this way will also allow the Partnership 
access across its own property to the southeast corner of its property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON REFORMATION CLAIM 
1. To show a mutual mistake, a party must show that the terms of the written 
instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the agreement between the 
parties. 
2. A mutual mistake occurred in the 1967 warranty deed to the Ericksens. 
That deed purported to convey 75.8 acres to the Ericksens, yet when the description is compared 
with what Veibell actually owned in 1967, the description purported to convey to the Ericksens 
nearly 10 acres of land Veibell did not own and could not convey. This was not intended by the 
parties. 
3. The parties intended a transfer of about 75 acres. 
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4. The intent to transfer about 75 acres is shown by the plain language of the 
warranty deed, the Real Estate Contract, and the Surveyor's Certificate. The language '75.8 
acres, more or less" cannot be interpreted to mean less than 65 acres. 
5. This intent is also shown by the purchase price of $13,125 because the 
price per acre for the sale was $175 per acre, and $13,125 divided by 175 is 75. 
6. Because the Moser description contained in the warranty deed does not 
reflect the true agreement of the parties, the Court will reform the warranty deed property 
description to describe a parcel of property consistent with Defendant's Exhibit 18. While this 
is less than 75 acres, it is closer to 75 acres than the description urged by Veibell. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO WEST TRIANGLE 
1. All previous findings of fact and conclusions of law made herein are 
incorporated by this reference. 
2. In or about 1958, the Veibells obtained legal title to 208.5 acres based on 
the following property description: 
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the Northwest corner of 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 
2 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, running thence South 208.5 
rods; thence East 160 rods; thence North 208.5 rods; thence West 
160 rods to the place of beginning, containing 208.5 acres. 
3. The north boundary of this parcel separated Veibell's property from 
property owned by the Ericksens. Both the Veibells and Ericksens believed that a fence that 
separated their properties ran along the north boundary. The fence, however, did not follow the 
record boundary line. 
4. Both the Veibells and Ericksens have for years farmed up to the fence line. 
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5. When Veibell executed the 1967 warranty deed transferring about 75 acres 
to the Ericksens, the Moser description contained in the warranty deed used the fence line as the 
north boundary of the parcel conveyed. 
6. Because the 1967 warranty deed used the fence line rather than the record 
boundary line as the north boundary of the parcel conveyed, a small triangle of property 
containing about 1.74 acres remained in Veibell's name according to the real property records of 
Box Elder County. 
7. Veibell has never farmed, used, or otherwise occupied the 1.74 acre 
triangle, and Veibell did not make a claim to the 1.74 acre triangle until 1999. The description of 
the parcel claimed by Veibell is contained in the caption of this case. 
8. Immediately following the 1967 conveyance to the Ericksens, the 
Ericksens removed the fence that previously divided their property from Veibell's property. The 
Ericksens or Mr. Ericksen's family farmed or occupied the 1.74 acre triangle before the 
conveyance for decades, and the Ericksens or the Partnership have farmed or otherwise occupied 
the 1.74 acre parcel since the 1967 conveyance. 
9. The Ericksens have paid taxes on 75.8 acres of property acquired from 
Veibell since 1967, yet because of an error in the 1967 warranty deed the Ericksens have been 
allowed by Veibell to occupy only about 65 acres, plus the 1.74 acre triangle. 
10. The Court finds that under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence title 
to the 1.74 acre triangle should be quieted in the name of the Partnership. The Veibells and 
Ericksens treated the fence line as the boundary between their properties for decades prior to the 
1967 conveyance; indeed, because Mr. Veibell claims that the same fence line should be 
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recognized as the boundary between his property and the Partnership's property with respect to 
the east triangle, Veibell is estopped from claiming that he also owns the 1.74 acre triangle. The 
Ericksens and later the Partnership have farmed or otherwise occupied the 1.74 acre triangle for 
more than twenty years, in fact for decades. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO WEST TRIANGLE 
1. Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, title to the 1.74 acre 
triangle should be quieted in the name of the Partnership. 
2. The Veibells and Ericksens treated the fence line as the boundary between 
their properties for decades prior to the 1967 conveyance. 
3. Indeed, because Mr. Veibell claims that the same fence line should be 
recognized as the boundary between his property and the Partnership's property with respect to 
another triangle further east, Veibell is estopped from claiming that the fence did not also 
separate the 1.74 acre triangle from his property. 
4. The Ericksens and later the Partnership have farmed or otherwise occupied 
the 1.74 acre triangle for more than twenty years, in fact for decades. 
5. Title to the 1.74 acre triangle will be quieted in the name of the 
Partnership. 
FINDINGS OF FACT-BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AS TO 
FENCE BY WILLOW CREEK 




2. A fence was constructed between the properties and roughly along Willow 
Creek. 
3. The parties presented contrary evidence concerning who constructed the 
fence and whether it was constructed along the boundary. 
4. The Court has found that the record boundary should be reformed to come 
closer to the fence. The Court also finds, however, that the fence was not intended as the 
boundary between the properties. 
5. Alton Veibell testified that he did not intend the fence to be the boundary 
between the properties. He testified the location of the fence was an accommodation to the 
Ericksens so the Ericksen's horses could water in Willow Creek. 
6. The Court has found that the true boundary should be as reflected in 
Defendant's Exhibit 18, and that the parties intended that be the boundary and not the fence. 
7. Because the Court finds that the parties intended the boundary to be as 
reflected in Defendant's Exhibit 18, the evidence does not establish the fence as the boundary 
under the theory of boundary by acquiescence. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
AS TO FENCE BY WILLOW CREEK, 
1. Alton Veibell never acknowledged or consented to the fence as the 
demarcation between the properties. 
2. The fence was not intended as the boundary between the properties. The 
parties intended the boundary to be as reflected in Defendant's Exhibit 18. 
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3. The Partnership has not established that the fence along Willow Creek is 
the boundary under a theory of boundary by acquiescence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT-BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AS TO 
EASTERN TRIANGLE 
1. On or about 1958, Alton Veibell obtained legal title to 208.5 acres based 
on the following property description: 
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the 
Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 West of 
the Sale Lake Meridian, running thence South 208.5 
rods; thence East 160 rods; thence North 208.5 rods; 
thence West 160 rods to the place of beginning, 
containing 208.5 acres. 
2. The north boundary of this parcel separated Veibell's property from 
property owned by the Ericksens. Both Veibell and the Ericksens believed that a fence that 
separated their properties ran along the north boundary. The fence, however, did not follow the 
record boundary line. 
3. That fence has been in existence since at least 1920. 
4. The Ericksens have farmed up to the fence line for decades. 
5. Either Alton Veibell or his father have farmed up to the fence, east of 
Willow Creek, every year from approximately 1939 to the present 
6. From at least 1920 until his death in 1951, Alton Veibell's father 
acknowledged the fence as the boundary line. 
7. From the early 1930's until the present Alton Veibell has acknowledged 
the fence as the boundary line. 
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8. Bryce Ericksen, J. Durrell Ericksen's brother, who grew up in the area, 
also testified that he had always understood the fence to be the boundary line between the 
Ericksen property and the Veibell property. 
9. The Court finds that under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence title 
to the eastern triangle should be quieted in the name of Alton Veibell. The Veibells and 
Ericksens treated the fence line as the boundary between their properties for decades; indeed, 
because the Partnership claims that the same fence line should be recognized as the boundary 
between its property and the Veibell property with respect to the western triangle, the Partnership 
is estopped from claiming that it also owns the eastern triangle. Alton Veibell and his father 
before him have farmed or otherwise occupied the eastern triangle for more then twenty years, in 
fact for decades. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AS TO 
EAST TRIANGLE 
1. The Veibells have occupied the land to the fence in excess of twenty years. 
The land owners on both the north and south side of the fence have acknowledged the fence as 
the boundary line for a period in excess of twenty years. 
2. The Veibells and Ericksens treated the fence line as the boundary between 
their properties since at least 1939. 
3. Indeed, because the Ericksens claim that the same fence line should be 
recognized as the boundary between the Partnership's property and the Veibell property with 
respect to the western triangle, the Partnership is estopped from claiming that the fence did not 
also separate the eastern triangle from its property. 
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4. Alton Veibell and his father have farmed or otherwise occupied the eastern 
triangle for more than twenty years, in fact for decades. 
5. Veibell has established a claim for boundary by acquiescence as to the 
fence line. 
6. Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, title to the eastern 
triangle should be quieted in the name of Alton Veibell. 
7. Title to the eastern triangle will be quieted in the name of Alton Veibell. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHN Corporation, a Utah corporation, ) 
) FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
J. ALTON VEIBELL and WILLOW CREEK ) 
WATER COMPANY, L.C., a Utah Limited ) 
Liability Company, ) 
Defendant. ) 
J. ALTON VEIBELL and GRETHE ) 
VEIBELL, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
RHN CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; ) ^^ ~ ~ ^ 
LEOLA J. ERICKSEN FAMILY LIMITED y ^ 
PARTNERSHIP; CLARENCE RICHARDS; /) Civil No. 980100719 
LODEES RICHARDS; CHARLOTTE S — = ^ " 
NELSON; TERRI HOWARD and ) 
GERALD HOWARD, ) Judge Ben Hadfield 
Third-Party Defendants. 
J. ALTON VEIBELL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LEOLA J. ERICKSEN FAMILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; all persons 
claiming any right, title, or interest in the 
following property in Box Elder County, 
Utah: Beginning at a Point 1834.75 feet 
SO0 l O ^ ' E and 1629.34 feet S89° 49'33MW 
from the NE corner of Section 23, T12N, 
R2W, SLB&M, and running then West 
1009.35 feet more or less to the center line 
of Section 23, then SO0 10'27"E along the 
center of section line 150.19 feet more feet 
more or less to a point in line with a line 
bearing N81° 31,59,,E from the P.O.B., 
t h e n N S l ^ l ^ ' E 1020.01 feet more or 
less to the Point of Beginning. Containing 
1.74 Acres more or less. 
Defendants. 
Bench trial was held October 12-13, 2000 in this matter on the claims remaining 
between the Leola J. Ericksen Family Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") and J. Alton 
Veibell ("Veibell"). All other matters were either dismissed earlier by the Court or settled by the 
parties. Larry S. Jenkins appeared for the Partnership and Russell Cline appeared for Veibell. 
Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, heard the testimony of the witnesses, 
and hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court has entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and is now prepared to enter this Final Order and Judgment. Accordingly, 
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IT IS ORDERED that RHN Corporation's complaint in this matter is dismissed, 
with the parties to that matter to bear their own attorney fees and costs; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is awarded the Partnership on its 
third-party counterclaims for reformation of the 1967 deed, which was offered and received as 
Defendant's Exhibit 12, and that the property description of the 1967 deed is ordered reformed to 
provide a boundary between the properties consistent with Defendant's Exhibit 18. As such, title 
to the following described parcel is hereby quieted in the name of the Leola J. Ericksen Family 
Limited Partnership: 
Part of the East half of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described further as: 
Beginning at a point in the N-S centeriine of said Section 23, said 
point being south 1898.35 ft. and West 2640 ft. (160 rods) from the 
NE Corner of said Section 23; thence S83°54!01"E 94.32 ft.; 
thence N81°36f00"E 807.50 ft.; thence S05°15'00MW 1091.80 ft.; 
thence S15°59'00E 1089.50 ft.; thence S07o0700f,W 1332.00 ft.; 
thence West 927.70 ft. along the South line of said Section 23; 
thence North 3348.40 ft. to the point of beginning. Containing in 
all 73.028 acres more or less. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is awarded the Partnership on its 
claim for boundary by acquiescence as to the 1.74 acre west triangle of property, and that title to 
the following described parcel of property is hereby quieted in the name of the Leola J. Ericksen 
Family Limited Partnership: 
Part of the East half of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described further as: 
Beginning at a point in the N-S centeriine of said Section 23, said 
point being South 1839.75 ft. (111.5 rods) and West 2640 ft. (160 
rods) from the NE Corner of said Section 23, thence East 1010.65 
ft.; thence S81°3r59MW 1021.80 ft; thence North 150.45 ft. to the 
point of beginning. Containing in all 1.745 acres more or less. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered for J. Alton Veibell and 
Grethe C. Veibell on their third-party claim for boundary by acquiescence; as such, title to the 
following described parcel of land is quieted in the name of J. Alton Veibell and Grethe C. 
Veibell: 
Part of the East half of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described further as: 
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the NE Corner of said 
Section 23, thence West 1629.34 ft. more or less to an existing 
fence; thence approximately N81°42'25"E along said fence 
1646.56 ft. to the Section line, thence South approximately 
237.49 ft. to the point of beginning. Together with and subject to a 
49.5 ft. easement along the Section line (East side) of the parcel for 
the Cache County Road. Containing in all 4.442 acres more or 
less. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other claims, counterclaims, third-party 
claims, and third-party counterclaims not expressly addressed herein are dismissed, and that this 
shall constitute the final order and judgment of the Court. 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorneys for J. Alton Veibell 
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that the.parties ever intended this boundary line to 
1 the other side, on 
1 none. Nobody ever 
J As to the last 
be on 
the east side of this creek? Absolutely 
testified as to any such intent. 
issue, that is this boundary by 
J acquiescence, I would just state that again this was 
J convenience fence. 
J convenience fence. 
Wilkinson case. I 
The testimony was that it was a 
I will give the court a copy of 1 




It says that in a case of a convenience fence the doctrine of 
1 boundary by acquiescence just does not apply. 
1 Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
very well prepared 
I want to commend both counsel : 
and professional in the manner in 
they tried the case. 
The court will 
reformation claim, 
rule as follows. With regards to 
the court will reform the deed to 
with the description as shown in defendant's exhibit 
18. This results in a parcel of land of approximate! 








court finds that this reformation of the deed is appropriate. 
That the evidence on this issue is clear and convincing. 
I'll enumerate 
them, at this time. 
some of those factors, though not 
This deed description will come 
all of 
closer 
to the existing fence. This description allows access to 
that southeast triangle of the Ericksen property which would 
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otherwise be inaccessible. The sales price was clearly based 
upon a specific number of acres, 75. The 73 acres is more 
close to 75; 64 is less. Mr. Veibell was paid for 75 acres. 
Since the date of the transaction the Ericksens have paid 
taxes on 75 acres. Mr. Veibell, on the other hand, has not 
paid taxes on the area in dispute because of the way the 
county treats the property in deducting the transfers from 
the original parcel. 
For that reason the court finds that the Ericksens 
prevail on the deed reformation claim and, again, it is as to 
the 73 acres. I'm not enlarging it to the 76 acre suggested 
amount. 
As to the same properties, the evidence does not 
establish the fence as any type of a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
As to the other parcels that are shown on plaintiff's 
exhibit one, the court finds that the Veibells have shown 
that the fence has been considered as the boundary. That a 
boundary by acquiescence has occurred. That parcel B should 
now be vested in the Veibells as their property. Further, 
that parcel A would be vested in the Ericksens. 
As a matter of being consistent, the only testimony I've 
heard is that the fence was treated as the boundary and it 
was the same fence all the way through. There's been no 
effort by Mr. Veibell to ever claim parcel A since the time 
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of the conveyance. And as a minimum he would be estopped in 
any other action from somehow now coming in and claiming that 
the fence was not a boundary. The court adjudicated in his 
favor that in fact it was the boundary. So parcel A would be 
determined to be the property of the Ericksens. 
Ifm going to ask counsel to -- this will be a little 
unusual, but I'm confident the two of you can work together. 
I'll ask counsel to each prepare detailed findings and 
conclusions on those causes on which you have prevailed. 
Then, if you want to work out some way to exchange a disk, 
I'd prefer to have this all in one set of documents. One set 
of findings and one judgment and decree. However you can 
work that out. I want you each to prepare those as to the 
claims on which you prevailed. 
Any questions? 
MR. CLINE: I don't think so. 
MR. JENKINS: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Good luck. Court is in 
recess 
THE BAILIFF: Court's in recess 
^Concluded at 11:30 a.m.) 
